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Preface
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dealt with in chapter 4, and to all those who participated
as subject in one of the experiments.
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STELLINGEN
1. Wanneer mensen zich op een positief gewaardeerde dimensie
met een ander vergelijken, dan streven zij niet naar maxi-
malisatie, maar naar optimalisatie van het verschil tussen
beiden.
2. De Speltheorie is in de sociale psychologie geen theorie,
maar een onderzoeksparadigma.
3. De belangrijke betekenis die Kelley en Thibaut's "Theory of
interdependence" heeft voor de analyse van interpersoon-
lijke relaties, zal nog vergroot worden, wanneer in de
theorie ook de "inputs" worden opgenomen van de personen
die in de relatie betrokken zijn.
Kelley, H.H. and Thibaut, J.W. InterperaonaZ reZationa.New York: Wiley, 1978.
4. Wanneer al de matrixwaarden van een Prisoner's Dilemma Game
of een Maximizing Difference Game met een constante worden
verhoogd, dan maken coóperatief ingestelden meer C- (coápe-
ratieve) keuzen en competitief ingestelden meer D- (compe-
titieve) keuzen.
5. De relatie attributie - gedrag is minstens zo problematisch
als de relatie attitude - gedrag.
6. Vanuit een attributietheoretisch gezichtspunt kan men agres-
sie en altruisme als elkaars tegendeel beschouwen en opnemen
in één theorie.
7. De bevinding dat sociale interactie stimulerend werkt op de
cognitieve ontwikkeling heeft belangrijke implicaties voor
het onderwijs: niet alleen voor degenen die traditioneel
worden aangeduid als onderwijs-ontvangenden, maar ook voor
degenen die traditioneel worden aangeduid als onderwijs-
gevenden.
8. Degenen die hun hond z'n behoefte laten doen in zandbakken
en op speelweiden die voor kinderen bestemd zijn, laten op
zeer concrete wijze zien schijt aan kinderen te hebben.
(Stellingen behorende bij M. Poppe: Social comparison in two-
~erson experimental games. Tilburg, mei 1980.)
Aan mijn Ouders,
aan Elly en Eddie
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1.1. The Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Interdependency is a fundzmental characteristic of human
relations. It often happens that people make decisions or
behave in ways that have consequences for others, as well as
for themselves. On some occasions these consequences may be
greater than on others. Zn most cases they will be less
severe than in the following anecdote, ascribed to A.W.
Tucker, concerning the verdict of an American court:
"Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The
district attorney is certain that they are guilty of aspecific crime, but he does not have adequate evidence
to convict them at a trial. He points out to each
prisoner that each has two alternatives: to confess to
the crime the police are sure they have done, or not to
confess. If they both do not confess, then the district
attorney states he will book them on some very minor
trumped-up charge such as petty larceny and illegal
possession of a weapon, and they will both receive minor
punishment; if they both confess they will be prosecuted,
but he will recommend less than the most severe sentence;
but if one confesses and the other 3oes not, then the
confesscr will receive lenient treatment for turning
state's evidence whereas the latter will get 'the book'slapped at him." (Luce ~ Raiffa, 1957, p.95)
The problem with which each of the prisoners is confronted
can be expressed in the form of a matrix, as in Figure 1-1.
In this matrix we have filled in different numbers of months
for the prison sentences. It is important to bear in mind
that the two prisoners are unable to communicate with one
another and that each of them must make his decision without
knowina what the other's decision is.
Let us wcrk out what the best solution to this problem would
be. If Prisoner 2 does not confess, it would be more
"rational" for Prisoner 1 to confess than not to confess. In
fact, if Prisoner 1 were to confess, he would be sentenced to
















Figure 1-1. Schematic representation of the Prisoner's Dilemma
Game. On the left, below each diagonal: no. of
months prison sentence for Prisoner 1; to the
right and above each diagonal: no. of months
prison sentence for Prisoner 2.
Even if Prisoner 2 were to confess it would still be more
"rational" for Prisoner 1 to confess, than not to confess, since
a sentence of 96 months is preferable to 120 months. This means
that, regardless of what Prisoner 2 does, it would be better for
Prisoner 1 to confess. According to this same line of reasoning,
Prisoner 2 would also do better to confess. But if both of them
were to confess, they would both receive sentences of 8 years.
So if both of them adopt a rational approach to the problem,
then each will receive the worst-but-one possible result in this
sítuation. A much better result would be obtained if neither of
them were to confess. 3ut if a prisoner were to choose this
option he would have to rely on the other's not confession,
either. If, for example, Prisoner 1 díd not confess, whereas
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Prisoner 2 did, then Prisoner 2 would already be free while
Prisoner 1 had barely started his 10-year sentence. This
explains why the problem is called the "Prisoner's Dilemma".
It is difficult to advise someone involved in this and similar
situations as to what his optimal behavior should be. 6dhat can
be done, however, is to study, empirically, the kind of -
decisions that people make in situations of this kind. For
practical and, above all, for ethical reasons, one can hardly
make use, for this purpose, of the specific circumstances of the
district attorney. Therefore situations are usually created
in which the decisions are not related to months or years but
to "utilities", such as points, or sums of money. An example
of this can be seen ín Figure 1-2. Matrix (1) in this figure
is the abstract form. The symbols in this matrix have the
following meanings: R is the Reward for trust, when both make
the C-choice. P is the Punishment, when both make the D-
choice. T is the Temptation to make the D-choice when one
expects the Other to make a C-choice. If the one makes a C-
choice while the other makes a D-choice, then one receives
the outcome for a Sucker (S). A game qualifies for the name
"Prisoner's Dilemma" when, at least, the two following
requírements have been met: (a) S G P~ R~ T and (b)
2R ~ S t T. The entries in matrix (2) in Figure 1-2 meet both
these requirements.
In a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) like the one in matrix (2)
one can say that both participants can obtain outcomes without
one person's outcome being gained at the expense of the
other's. There are other types of games in which one person's
profit is the other person's loss. These games are therefore
called "zero-sum games". Games like the PDG are called "non-
zero-sum games" to distinguish them from the other type.
3
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Figure 1-2. PDG matrix (R - reward, S- sucker,
T - temptation, P - punishment).
1.2. Game theory
The Prisoner's Dilemma Game has been derived from the Game
theory and considerable attention has been given to it in
this theory. The word "game" here does not,.in the first
instance, refer to a certain kind leisure-time occupation for
children or adults. Rather, it is applied to every situation
involving two or more persons each of whom can make a choice
between two or more alternatives which all have consequences
for every person concerned. Gallo and McClintock (1965)
define a game as "a situation in which the persons involved
are attempting to attain some goal(s) and in which their
success or failure is dependent not only upon their strategy
choices but also upon the strategy choices of the other
individual(s) in the situation".
For a game like the PDG the number of participants is
restricted to two and the number of alternatives also
restricted to two. It is therefore known as a"two-person,
two-choice game".
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The Game Theory, which was mainly developed by Von Neumann ~
Morgenstern (1947), is described by Morgenstern (1965, p.65)
as follows:
"The theory of games is a mathematical discipline designed
to treat rigourously the question of optimal behavior of
participants in games of strategy and to determine the
resulting equilibria. In such games each participant is
striving for his greatest advantage in situations where
the outcome depends not only on his actions alone, nor
solely on those of nature, but also on those of other
participants whose interests are sometimes opposed, some-
times parallel, to his own. Thus, in games of strategy
there is conflict of interest as well as possible cooper-
ation among the participants. There may be uncertainty
for each participant because the actions of others may
not be known with certainty. Such situations, often of
extreme complexity, are found not only in games but also
in business, politics, war and other social activities.
Therefore, the theory serves to interpret both games
themselves and social phenomena with which certain games
are strictly identical. The theory is normative in that
it aims at giving advice to each player about his optimal
behavior; it is descriptive when viewed as a model for
analyzing empirically given occurrences. In analyzing
games the theory does not assume rational behavior;
rather, it attempts to determine what "rational" can mean
when an individual is confronted with the problem of
optimal behavior in games and equivalent situations."
As we have seen, in connection with the Prisoner's Dilemma
Game, it is not possible, ín some games, to indicate on a
rational basis what the best choice would be. In such
situations it is instructive to examine what decisions people
do actually make. This is also the case in situations in which
the principle of rationality does indicate what the best
decisions would be. Here again one can check whether these
decisions are, indeed, made. For such purposes research should
be carried out along empirical lines.
1.3. Experimental games
When games are considered as a laboratory task, in order to
study how people behave in situations of interdependence, one
can speak of "experimental games". Since 1955, or thereabouts,
experimental games have received the attention of many
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investigators in social psychology. A great deal of research
has been carried out on the effects of a large number of
variables such as strategy, personality characteristics,
communication and instructions. It is beyond the scope of this
dissertation to describe all the research in this field. For a
summarv and references see, for example, Guyer 8 Perkel
(1971), Wrightsman, O'Connor 8 Baker (1972), Krivohlav~ (1974)
and Pruitt a Kimmel (1977).
Pruitt 8 Kimmel, in 1977, assessing the results of "twenty
years of experimental gaming", make the following observation:
"Game research has a peculiar status. On the one hand it
has been immensely popular, with over 1000 published
studies (...). But on the other hand, the results of these
studies have been largely ignored by the broader field.
Our diagnosis of this situation stresses an undesirable
method-bound approach, lacking in theory and with little
concern for external validity." (p.63)
The lack of theory in gaming research can hardly be denied.
Even in the earliest experiments it soon became apparent that
the assumption of own gain maximization derived from
mathematics and economics, was not borne out. Game theory has
not been modified in social psychology since then, nor has it
been replaced by another theory. Instead, "game theory" in
social psychology became a label for a certain research
paradigm which was, indeed, extremely "method-bound". In many
studies only one sort of game was used, namely, the PDG.Later on
in this chapter we shall describe how major developments in
gaming research have occurred in conjunction with a modifica-
tion of the matrix.
One of the leading investiaators in the field of gaming
research, Anatol Rapoport, wrote in the preface of the book
"Prisoner's Dilemma" (1965, pp. Vi, vii), concerning the
application of scientific method to personality, intellect and
moral commitment:
"Typical conclusions are arrived at by applying intricate
scaling techniques and sophisticated significance tests to
masses of data highly specific to the particular question
under in~restigation. Such conclusions are frequently no
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more revealing than that 'people who score high on test T1
are somewhat likely to score high on test TZ'.
Regardless of whether these results are trivial or dra-
matic, the fact remains that little has been done to
enhance a broad understanding of man from these fragments.
The knowledge so gathered remains a catalogue of
'findings'.
This observation seams highly applicable to gaming research.
Nineteen years later a 600-page overview of gaming research
appeared (Kiivohlavy, 1974). This book contains an extensive
collection of results. Freund 8 Marton (1976) in a review,
rightly refer to it as "the whole two-person, non-zero-sum
game catalogue". ~he book contains no more than 30 pages on
theory. Pruitt and Kimmel (1977), too, apart from their own
goal~expectation theory, which specifies the conditions on
which PDG participants make a cooperative choice, report only
a few, very isolated (mini)theories in the field of gaming
research.
The method advocated by Rapoport (1965, p. vii) is as follows:
"Instead of asking a complicated question (as all psycho-
logical important questions must be) and coming up with a
very simple answer (often in the form of yes, no, or
maybe), one might try asking a very simple question such
as 'given a choice between two alternatives, what will a
person do?', and derive a rich and complex avalanche of
answers."
The collection of data could then be transformed, by mathe-
matical methods, into a purely formal theory which could
eventually be interpreted in a psychological way. However,
one should realize that the mere decision what alternatives
one offers the person to choose from, determines what theory
will be (im)possible.
The major function of experimental research in social psycho-
logy is to test hypotheses derived from a theory or to
contribute, in other ways (heuristic, for example) to the
development of a theory. This theory should be of explanatory
or predictive value with regard to the phenomena occurring in
the reality outside the laboratory. There is little sense in
linking results from laboratory research directly (that is,
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without the intermediate link of theory.) to everyday reality,
yet this has repeatedly been done in gaming research. It is
not clear whether this has led to the relative lack of theory
development, or whether the fact that there is little theory
is the reason for the frequent attempts to find a direct link
between laboratory research and phenomena in everyday reality.
Probably both causes play a role here.
1.9. Kelley 8 Thibaut's "Theory of Interdependence"
Pruitt a Kimmel, in their 1977 overview, were obviously unable
to include Kelley B Thibaut's "Theory of Interdependence" which
was published in 1978, in a book entitled "Interpersonal
relations". This book represents a further step in the
analysis of interpersonal relations published by the authors
(Thibaut 8 Kelley) in 1959.
Thibaut s Kelley adopt as starting point for their analysis
the interaction in a dyadic relationship. Interaction can be
considered to occur whenever two people "emit behavior in each
other's presence and when there is at least the possibility
that the actions of each person affect the other". As unit for
the analysis of behavior they took "a number of specifíc motor
and verbal acts that exhibit some degree of sequential
organization directed toward the attainment of some immediate
goal and~or state". This is called a behavior sequence or set.
Every person has a repertoire of sets. An interaction between
two persons can be described by means of the i4ems which each
of the two selects fror his own repertoire. An interaction
yields, for the person concerned, outcomes that can be
described as the difference betweeti the rewards ("the
pleasures, satisfactions and gratifications the person enjoys")
minus the costs ("any factors that operate to inhibit or deter
the performance of a sequence of behavior"). The rewards and
costs can be determined by exogenous and endogenous factors.
The former are factors that the person takes with him in every
relationship (such as values, needs, skills, tools, predis-
B
positions) and are thus external to a certain relationship.
The latter factors are intrinsic to a certain interaction.
"The central point is that the specific values associated with
a given item in A's repertoire depend upon the particular item
in B's repertoire with which, in the course of interaction, it
is paired" (pp. 15-16).
The pairing of items from A's behavioral repertoire with items
from B's behavioral repertoire is best visualized by thinking
of a matrix in which all the items in A's repertoire
constitute the rows, and all the items in B's repertoire, the
columns. The cells then represent all the events that could
possibly occur in the interaction. One can also indicate, in
the cells, the outcomes that the various events yield for the
two individuals. These outcomes are (psychologically) scaled
wíth the "comparison level" (CL) as zero point.
"The CL is the standard against which the participant
evaluates the "attractiveness" of the relationship or how
satisfactory it is. This is the standard that reflects the
quality of outcomes that the participant feels he or she
deserves. Outcomes falling above CL are experienced as
relatively satisfying and those below CL as unsatisfactory.
The location of CL on the person's scale of outcomes is
determined by all the outcomes known to the member, either
by direct experience or by observation of others. The more
attainable an outcome, the heavier it will be weighted in
forming the CL." (Thibaut 8 Kelley, 1978, pp. 8-9).
Outcomes that a person obtains from a relationship may have a
negative value, that is, they may be seen as relatively un-
satisfactory. Despite this, the person will continue the
relationship if no better alternative is available. If a better
alternative should be available, then the person will abandon
the relationship. The outcomes will then have dropped below the
so-called "comparison level for alternatives (CLalt) '
If, for the sake of simplicity, the number of items in A and
B's repertoires is restricted to two, this will produce an
outcome structure of the kind shown in matrix (1) in Figure
1-3. In this matrix the entries indicate the outcomes for






















Fígure 1-3. Maximizing Difference Game and transformations.
It is possible, however, that Person A and B, faced with a
choíce between C and D, may be influenced not by their own,
independent, outcomes, but by the outcomes that they might
obtain jointly, or by how many more outcomes one might obtain
than the other. Matrix (1) in Fiyure 1-3 could then be changed
according to a"max joint" (maximization of joint gain) or a
"max rel" (maximization of relative gain) transformation into,
respectively, matrix (2) and matrix (3) of Figure 1-3. In this
way, the matrix "given" by the physical and direct social
circumstances is changed into an "effective" matrix by means of
a transformation process. According to Kelley R Thibaut (1978,
p.19), a transformation process "affords a way of describing
important social determinanta of behavior (soc~.31 values
and sociotemporal oraanization of behavior) and of movincr
f-om the level of s~ecific behavior to more com~lex social
phenomena such as the interplay of different orientations
to social interaction and systems of rules, roles and
norms."
Transformaticns of the matrix make it clear that the matrix is
not simply a collection of entries, each of which relates to an
outcome, but that it is a c,uestion of the pattern of entries
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in the matrix. This also finds its expression in the analysis
of interpersonal relations in terms of various components. In
1959 Thibaut and Kelley (pp. 102-103) made a distinction
between the two forms of control that one person can exercise
over another. One form is ~ate Control (FC): "By varying his
behavior, A can affect B's outcomes regardless of what B does".
The other form is Behavior Control (BC): "By varying his
behavior, A can make it desirable for B to vary tiis behavior,
too". The degree of interdependence in a relationship is
determined by the degree of FC and BC. Person A can change his
behavior and this can affect his own outcomes, regardless of
what B does. In such a case Kelley and Thibaut (1978, p. 31)
speak of Reflexive Control (RC). Besides the three components
already mentioned there is also a general level, known as the
Grand Mean (GM) of a person's outcomes. The pattern of out-
comes of a person in a matrix is composed, in its entirety, of
the four components, GM, FC, RC and BC. Chapter 4 of this
dissertation goes further into the quantitative aspect of this.
The components can be distinguished in both a'given" and a
"effective" matrix. The components and the relations between
them, in fact, determine the characteristics of an inter-
dependence relationship. Kelley and Thibaut explain this in a
highly analytical fashion.
1.5. The minimal social situation
In this paragraph we shall be taking a closer look at the
phenomenon of "fate control", using a specific research
situation as example. The example, here, is what is known as
the "minimal social situation". According to Gallo and
McClintock (1965) research into the minimal social situation
is one of the historical forerunners of experimental game
research. The example serves to indicate how far-reaching an
interdependence situation can be. The interdependence in the
study in question occurs without either of the persons
involved in the interaction being aware of the other's
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existence. The study is one of a series of experiments started
by Sidowski, Wyckoff 8 Tabory (1956) and Sidowsky (1957) and
further elaborated by Kelley, Thibaut, Radloff and Mundy
(1962). We shall describe one experimental situation from this
last artícle.
mwo subjects, neither of whom is aware that anyone, beside him-
self, was participating in the study, are placed in separate
rooms. There they find two push-buttons (X and Y) and a counter.
They do not know that the two buttons are connected up with the
other person's counter. When one subject presses button X, the
other subject gets t10 points and when one subject presses
button Y, the other gets -10 points. So whenever one subject
presses a button, this has consequences for the other subject,
although neither is aware of this. The object of the set-up is
that each subject presses one of the two buttons every time he
receives a signal from the experimenter. In some conditions the
arrangement is such that the two persons alternate in pressing
the button and in other conditions the persons press the button
simultaneously. After 100 to 140 trials the subjects appear to
have presses the button awarding the other f10 point on average
in 478 of the cases in the first condition, and in 758 of the
cases in the latter condition. This difference may seem
surprising but can be clearly explained, as Kelley c.s. (1962)
demonstrated.
The clue to the explanation lies in the finding from learning
theory, namely, that if a person obtains a positive result
(reward) directly after 'emitting' a certain behavior, he is
likely to repeat that behavior, and that if he obtains a
negative result (punishment) after a certain behavior he will
not repeat that behavior. Kelley c.s. call this principle "wín-
stay, lose-chanoe" . If this rule is applied to the situation
in which two subjects, A and B, simultaneously make a choice
between X and Y, one arrives at the possibilities shown in
Figure 1-4. For the first choice, the subjects will select X
or Y at random, so ttiat four different combinations occur.
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Bt Ji gX gt -~ BXX gt -~ gXn gt
A- -~ AY ~ ~r A- -~ AX ` ~ At ~ AX At
(z) ~( Y Y ~l etc.
Y
(3)
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Figure 1-4. Simultaneous response sequences in minimal social
situation.
According to the "win-stay, lose-chanae " principle, each of
these combinations will lead, within three trials, to a chain
of X-choices. In the condition in which A and B alternately
choose between X and Y, thinas will turn out differently, as
can be seen in Fiaure 1-5. The case in this situation is such
that onl~~ if both A and B haopen to choose X on the first trial
will the sec?uence lead to a stable series of exclusively X-
choices, according to the "win-stay, lose-chance " principle.
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A At -a A At ~ A At -~ A At
(1)
~YX ~ ~YX ~ iX I ,~X ?
etc.
Bt BX Bt -~ BX Bt -s BX Bt --i BX
(2) !X ~- -~ ~Y ~t-' ~ ~--~ ~X ?- etc.
Bt BY B- -~ BX B- -~ BY Bt --~ BY
A A- A At
(3) 1 ~t-~~Y I-yJ~X ~ -s,~Y ~
etc.
B- BX B-~ BY Bt -i BY B- -~ BX
AY A- --~ AX A- -y AY At -i AY A-
(4) ~, ~ J 1 ~V r J' ~
etc.
B- Bl, Bt-i BY B- -~ BX B- -~ BY
2 3 4
Figure 1-5. Alternating response sequence in minimal social
situation.
If any other combination than XX is chosen, in the first trial,
then mixed X and Y choices will persist. In this way the simple
"win-stay, lose-change" rule can be used to explain why more
favorable (for the Other) choices are made in a simultaneous-
choice sequence than in an alternating-choice sequence.
Incidentally, this example raises a number of questions
concerning "Fate Control". By exercising Fate Control Person A
affects the outcomes that B receives and hence, also, B's
behavior. As Thibaut 8 Kelley (1959, p. 104) observed, an
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implicit conversion of Fate Control to Behavior Control has
occurred.
1.6. Motives and matrices
The "win-stay, lose-change " principle of the minimal social
situation is consonant with what is taken as starting point
for the normative Game theory: people attempt to maximize
their outcomes. It appears, from research into experimental
games, that this motí`~e is not the only one operating in
decision situations involving two people. McClintock ~ McNeel
(1966 a, b,~c, d, 1967) suggested the possibility of t'.oo
other motives besides that of maximizing one's own gain
(individualism), namely, a motive to maximize joint gain
(cooperation) and a motive to attain as many more outcomes as
the Other, as possible (competition). In a PDG (see matrix
(2) in Figure 1-2) cooperation will lead to a C-choice. A D-
choice in a PDG, however, can be determined by either
individualism or competition. In order to make a distinction
between individualism and competition, McClintock 8 McNeel
created a new sort o.f game, namely, the Maximizing Difference
Game (MDG). An example of a MDG can be found in matrix (1) in
Figure 1-3. In a MDG both individualism and cooperation lead
to a C-choice. A D-choice in this type of game indicates
competition. Thus, in a PDG it is possible to establish
cooperation unequivocally, and in a A1DG competition can be
unequivocally established. Individualism, moreover, is seen as
an immediate maximization of own gain. As we have seen, in
paragraph 1.1, a person whose long-term strategy in a PDG, is
to maximize his gaín, will attempt to secure a C-choice by
both participants. McClintock ~ McNeel (1966 a, b, c, d,
1967) found that, in studies with a MDG, in general, a
considerable percentage of the choices were D-choices.
Naturally, this percentage is dependent on a variety of
factors, such as feedback of outcomes and the value of the
units in the matrix. One can say, however, that, in general,
competition has some effect on the choosing behavior in an
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experimental game.
It will be evident, from the above, that the kind of matrix
determines which moti~~es will be associated with a particular
choice. Moreover, the relation between choice and motive in
a PDG and MDG is no unambiguous one. In a PDG, for instance,
one can make a D-choice to obtain the "Temptation" pay off
(see matrix (1), Figure 1-2) or to avoid the "Sucker" pay off.
A particular choice can also be a strategic one, that is, one
designed to elicit certain behavior from the Other. Pruitt
(1967) and Messick 8 McClintock (1968) described another form
of game by means of which one can determine, unequivocally,
which motives lead to a certain choice. This form is known as
a'decomposed' game. In a decomposed game each of two persons,
is presented, separately, with two (or more) alternatives.
Each alternative yields a number of units for the Chooser and
for the Other. Each of the two receives units on the basis of
his own choice and on the basis of Other's choice. Figure 1-6
contains two examples. One can see that maximization of Joint
gain (cooperation) leads to the choices of alternative C and
that maximization of Own gain (individualism) and maximization
of Relative gain (competition) will both lead to the choice of
alternative D. The structure of a PDG can be recognized, here.
Combinations of C and~or D-choices by the two persons lead to
the pay offs shown as matrix-entries in PDG matrix (2). As can
be seen from matrices (3) and (4) of Figure 1-6, there is the
same relation between the decomposed and non-decomposed form
of a MDG as between that of a decomposed and non-decomposed
PDG. Apart from a PDG and MDG one can also create other types
of two-choice decomposed games. The number of alternatives
for a decomposed game can be extended without presenting many
problems. This enables one to study other motives, besides
individualism, cooperation and competition. This was done in
























Figure 1-6. Decomposed and non-decomposed PDG and MDG.
With the aid of a number of three-choice decomposed games,
they considered whether it was worthwhile distinguishing
aggression as a motive (minimization of Other's gain), in
addition to the three motives alreadv mentioned. The
alternatives which exclusively indicated the aggression motive
were not chosen any more often than alternatives that were
not based on any particular motive. Therefore it seemed rather
pointless, in this study, to distinguish aggression as a
motive.
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Kuhlman 8 Marshello (1975a, b) confronted subjects with a
number of three-choice decomposed games of various types. If
a subject, in the various types of games, fairly consistently
chose the alternatives belonging to a certain motive, he was
classified as having this motive as his dominant motive. In
this way most of the subjects could be classified as being
predominantly individualistically, cooperatively or competi-
tively oriented. From a further analysis of the choices of
those subjects who had not chosen consistently, according to
one of these three motives, it appeared that the choices of a
number of subjects had been consistently altruistic (maxi-
mization of Other's gain). This is also proved to be the case
in a study by Kuhlman ~ Wimberley (1976).
In the studies and analyses reported it was concluded, in each
case, on the basis of certain choices from two or more
alternatives that a particular motive was present (to a
certain extent). But this still fails to provide any insight
into the relations between the motives. Griesinger 6
Livingston (1973) and McClintock (1972, 1976) developed a
spatial model of social motives. This model consists of a
horizontal and a vertical axis representing, respectively, the
outcomes for the Chooser and the outcomes for the Other (see
figure 1-7). People's motives can then be represented as
vectors in this space. Individualism (maximizing Own gain)
can be thought of as a vector along the horizontal axis,
altruism (maximizing Other's gain) and aggression (minimizina
Other's gain) as two vectors, running in opposite directions
along the vertical axis. Cooperation (maximizing Joint gain)
can be imagined as t:ie vector dividing the upper right
quadrant in two and competition (maximizing Relative gain to
Own advantage) as the vector dividing the lower right
quadrant.
A person's preferences for a particular alternative is






Figure 1-7. Two-dimensional motivational vector space.
In figure 1-7 the two alternatives of the decomposed PDG in
matrix (1) of Figure 1-6 are shown in tY;e motivational space.
Clearly, alternative C has a greater projection on the
cooperation (and on the altruism) vector and alternative D a
greater projection on the individualism and competition (and
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agaression) vector.
Three further vectors have also been included in Figure 1-7,
namely, maximizing relative gain to Other's advantage
(martyrdom), minimizing Own gain (masochism) and minimizing
Joint gain (sadomasochism). Incidentally, the number of
possible motives is still not exhausted. MacCrimmon 8 Messick
(1976) distinguished further motives, including equalitarianism
(choosing so as to make your pay off and the other's pay off
more equal), proportionate competition (choosing so as to
increase the ratio of your pay off to the other's pay off) and
proportionate cooperation (choosing so as to increase the
product of your pay off and the other's pay off). These last
motives cannot be expressed as vectors in the two-dimensional
space of Figure 1-7.
The motives reported are, to a considerable degree, descriptive
in character. This can occasionally lead to uncertainty. As an
example we shall describe an experiment by Messé, Dawson and
Lane (1973). The subjects in this experiment had volunteered
to take part in "motivational research" for pay. Half of the
subjects made ten choices in a PDG with the values R-~.04,
T-~.06, S-~.01 and P-~.02 (cf. matrix (1), Figure 1-2).
The other half made ten choices in a PDG with values that were
ten times higher. Independently of this distribution, half of
the subjects first performed a certain task for about one and
a half hours before makinq the PDG choices, while the other
half started on the PDG choices immediately. It appeared that,
in the low-reward condition, the subjects made the cooperative
choice (C) in an average of about 60B of the trials, regardless
of whether they had performed a certain task beforehand. In the
high-reward condition the percentaqe of cooperative choices was
S1~ for those who had previously performed the task and 34~ if
no prior task had been performed.
In this study one can interpret the C-choices as expressions
of the motivation to maximize Joint gain and the D-choices as
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maximization of either Own or Relative gain. By doing this,
however, one is only describing and one thus fails to
penetrate to the core of the motivat'ional processes. As Messé,
Dawson and Lane report, one can consider the subject's choices
as having been made to obtain an equitable payment. According
to the equity motive, people desire outcomes which are
proportional to their inputs (such as time, effort, etc.). A
person establishes this proportion by comparing his inputs and
outcomes with those of a certain standard. This ma;~ be a
certain norm or it may be a person with whom one compares
oneself ín terms of inputs and outcomes (cf. Adams, 1965;
Walster, Berscheid and Walster, 1973).
The subjects who have already spent 1~ hours performing a task
can obtain an equitable reward for the time and effort they
have invested, in the high-reward condition. If the subjects
who had started on the PDG immediately had chosen C on a great
many trials in the high-reward condition, they would have
received a reward that was relatively high in comparison with
the time and effort invested. They can restrict the size of
the reward by both choosing D. These D-choices could be
described as minimization of Joint gain (sadoMasochism). The
rational described here for the high-reward condition does not
apply to the conditions with low rewards. The size of the
rewards here is such that they cannot be regarded as a
possible recompense for invested time and effort. In the high-
reward conditions, in fact, various other motives are used to
describe something that can be explained by the equity motive.
The same can also be said of a study by Pepitone (1971) and
Pepitone et al. (1970). A characteristic of all these studies
is that there is a difference in inputs or in outcomes alreadv
received at the moment that subjects start to make choices in
a qame. This is not the case in the majority of PDG and MDG
studies.
Since the outcomes preferred by the subject are related to the
inputs he has made, it is not possible, in the two-dimensional
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vector space of Figure 1-7, to draw in a vector which gives a
general representation of the equity motive. The equity vector
could, however, be given for a concrete situation, as Van
Avermaet, McClintock and Moskowitz (1978) have described. This
vector, which passes through the intersection of the two axes,
has a slope which is equal to the ratio of Own inputs to
Other's inputs. As demonstrated by Van Avermaet c.s. (1978)
and by Reiss and Gruzen (1976), equity is not only a motive
but can also be used as a strategy. This is the case when the
equity rule is used whenever it maximizes Own or Relative gain
and another rule (for instance, equality) whenever the latter
maximizes Own or Relative gain. It means that the one "motive"
can be adopted as a strategy within the framework of another
motive.
In view of the, often, purely descriptive character of the
motives mentioned here and of the mutual relations between the
motives, it seems appropriate to look for an integrated
approach to social motivation. In this connection we shall
examine, in the following chapters, what possibilities social
comparison offers as an explanatory motivational principle.





In this chapter a description of the phenomenon of social
comparison will be given. The next paragraph will provide an
overview of the major points of a theory of social motivation,
as described by ?2ijsman in a number of very recent publications
(1979a, b; in press a, b). The essence of this theory is the
way in which an individual experiences himself in relation to
others. The social comparison process, that constitutes an
important part of the theory, will be further elaborated, in
the form of a model, in the next paragraph-but-one. In the
final paragraph a few phenomena will be elucidated with the aid
of the motivation theory described here.
2.2. Riisman's theory of social motivationl)
In the course of perception a number of processes operate,
which enable the perceiver to know reality and to react to it
in a meaningful way. A person who, on the basis of a number of
stimuli of form, size, color, etc, believes that he is dealing
with a table, reduces a large number of stimuli to a cue for
something that he calls "table". However, he can only speak
of a"table" when the object displays some similarity to other
objects called "table". But in order to say something about a
particular table, it is, at the same time, necessary for the
object in question to differentiate itself in some way from the
other tables. The fact that someone calls a certain object
"table" implies that certain behavior in relation to the objec:
1) Footnote: The essence of the theory does not differ
fundamentally in the four publications by Rijsman mentioned.
The oublications do differ, however, in the depth at which
certain points are discussed. References here are to the
publication which deals with the point in question at the
greatest length.
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will be more probable and other behavior less probable. The
concept "table" implies a number of action tendencies. If
another perceiver considers the object as something else (a
bed, for instance) and displays other action tendencies in
relation to the object, problems will arise. For in such a
case the actions related to the object will be difficult to
coordinate. The problem can be solved if one of the perceivers
changes his behavioral intentions (and thus gives the object
an other significance). One of the perceivers could also ignore
the other and could coordinate his ascription of ineaning and
his behavioral intentions with those of other perceivers
(where possible).
As Rijsman (1979b, pp. 288-289) describes, these processes are
not only involved in the perception of, for instance, physical
objects, but are of equal importance to the way in which an
individual experiences himself in relation to others. The
behavior prompted by this experiencing is what we call "social
behavior". This is because it is related to social reality,
that is to say the reality that consists, from the viewpoint
of the individual, of himself and beings-like-himself ("socii").
In Rijsman's analysis (1979b) of the Self~Other perception the
fundamental principles are defined as:
a. Social attribution. This is the reduction of variable
stimuli to a cue for an invariant unit of significance (the
person) underlying the stimuli.
b. Social comparison. The unit of significance (the person)
subjectively constitutes for the individual, one element in a
collection of conceptually similar elements (others-like-
himself), in such a way that this one element is at the
same time both equated with and distinguished from the
other elements.
c. Social validation. The subjective validity value of the
significance attributed to a unit depends on the extent to
which one's behavioral intention toward that unit can be
coordinated with the bel:avioral intentions of other
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perceivers toward the same unit of significance.
Althouah these principles can be distinguished at the
theoretical level, their actual roles in reality cannot be
separated. The three principles can be represented in a
single diagram. (See Fioure 2-1).
From stimuli, the individual (I) derives subjective cues
(CI and CD) for his own person (PI) and for the Other (P~).
These cues relate to the behavior and to everything connected
with it, that is, not only to deeds and to words but also to
the body and to material and cultural sjmbols such as
possessions, clothes, insignia, etc. The individual (I) will
not be confronted to the same degree with information stimuli
concerning himself and concerning Other.
t
social attribution
I -~ C -------------- ~I
I CC -------------- ~
social
comparison





Figure 2-1. Diagram of Self~Other perception according to
Rijsman (1979a, b; in press, a, b).
See text for explanation.
~
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Thus, he will be confronted with his own proprioceptive
(internal) stimuli but not with those of Other. In this
respect there is a difference between the individual's
standpoint in relation to himself and in relation to the
Other. One is dealing with one's own "inside" and with
Other's "outside". This difference can be partially reduced
if one imitates the Other, or is imitated by him, or if one's
"subjective self-awareness" is increased by a confrontation
with oneself in a mirror (Duval ~ Wicklund, 1972). However,
the complete abolition of this difference in standpoint is
virtually impossible to achieve. Jones and Tlisbett (1971)
demonstrated that the difference in standpoint affects the
process of attribution.
Rijsman (in press, a) uses Kelley's "principle of co-
variance" (1967) to explain the way in which an individual
concludes, from behavior, that there is an invariant unit of
significance (a person) underlying that behavior. A perceiver
attributes behavior to the characteristics of a particular
person when, in his opinion, that person's behavior differs
from that of others in similar circumstances. In order to
merit such attribution the difference in behavíor must be
systematic, that is to say, it must be consistent over time
and over perceptual conditions (modality). Rijsman (in press,
a) points out that even to be able to attribute behavior to
oneself and to be able to experience oneself as a person, a
consistent difference between one's own and other's
behavior in a certain situation is required. This attempt to
identify a consistent behavioral difference is, in fact, part
of the process of social comparison.
According to the principle of social comparison, knowledqe of
oneself as a person entails being similar to others-like-
oneself, and, at the same time, differentiating oneself from
these Others. The integrative tendency of the social
comparison process is expressed in Figure 2-1 by the loop
around both PI and P~, and the discriminative tendency by the
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separate loops around PI and P~. In the social comparison
process these two tendencies maintain an equilibrium at the
point at which the person is slightly different from the
Other. The comparison and differentiation are always made in
relation to a particular dimension of the person. If the
Individual attaches considerable value to this aspect of his
person and is thus highly involved in this dimension, this
will become an evaluative dimension for him. In view of his
involvement, an Individual will always prefer the positive
outcome of the comparison with the Other, that is , he will
prefer to be slightly better than the Other (this is
indicated by "}" in the social comparison portion of Figure
2-1) .
As Rijsman concludes, the essence of the social comparison
process is the attempt to obtain a slightly superior position,
in the comparison of Self with Other(s), on a dimension of
comparison of subjectively high value, and to maintain this
position. In order to achieve this, there are a number of
theoretical possibilities (Rijsman, 1979b, in press, a):
1. Introducing change in the social cues. The individual
introduces some change in the behavior, body or possessions
of himself and~or the Others, in such a way that the cues
for his own person provide a favorable contrast, in the
comparison with the Other's(s') cues.
2. Changing the meaning of social cues. This can be done, for
instance, by attributing or not attributing cues to a
person. An individual can improve his subjective position
on an evaluative dimension, in the comparison with the
Other, for example, by ascribing a negative result of his
own performance to misfortune and a positive result of
Other's performance to chance.
3. Choosing a different comparison-Other. For the comparison
one can choose someone from whom one can differentiate
oneself, in one's own favor.
4. Choosing a different dimension of comparison. As dimension
of comparison one can choose that aspect of the ?erson that
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makes a positive outcome for oneself most likely.
All four possibilities may not always be open. The dimension
of comparison that is relevant is determined, to a large
extent, by, for example, the culture in which one is living.
Certain persons may, (because of their physical presence, for
instance) be hard to ignore as comparison-Others. In reality,
making use of a certain possibility of obtaining or
maintaining a positive self-image involves costs (e.g.
efforts). These costs will largely determine which mechanisms
are to be used.
Rijsman (in press, a) applies the social comparison process
not only to single individuals but also to groups of
individuals. A certain individual can classify himself,
perceptually in (identify himself with) a certain group. This
group (the I-group) will try to differentiate itself from
other groups in exactly the same way as the single
individual attempts to differentiate himself from Others. The
individual in the group, in fact, avoids comparison with
Others in his own group. But this situation persists only as
long as the I-group is being compared with other groups. When
the inter-group comparison ceases, intra-group comparison
among individuals will occur.
The third (in logical sequence) process that Rijsman describes
is that of social validation. An individual (I), by means of
social attribution and social comparison, tries to obtain a
positive Self-image. He wishes to see his own opinion of his
Self-image (i.e. his opinion about the result of the
comparison with the Other) confirmed (validated) by an
Evaluator. To this end I concludes, from the cues (e.g.
reward, criticism) (CE) that the Evaluator uses to express his
assessment, how the Evaluator perceives the social cues (CI
and C~) and what impression of PI and P~ he forms on the basis
of these cues. I's assessment of himself is validated when the
Evaluator allocates to PI a more favorable position on
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dimension dx than to Pp. If such is the case (a "t" in the
"social validation" part of Figure 2-1) I will, in turn,
reciprocate the Evaluator's positive feelings (a "t" on the
left-hand side of Figure 2-1). Should the Evaluator's opinion
not coincide with that of I, then I will attempt to alter the
Evaluator's assessment by pointing out to him possible
"errors" in the perception of cues, the interpretation of
cues, the choice of comparison-Others or the choice of
dimension of comparison. If this fails and the Evaluator's
opinion remains negative, then I will adopt a negative
attitude to the Evaluator and will look for an evaluator
whose assessment is positive.
The ideas described above correspond to Heider's (1955)
balance model. An Individual with a positive Self-image (PI)
will determine his attitude to Other according to Other's
assessment of I's Self-image. As Rijsman (in press, a)
describes, the attempt to achieve balance and consensus is not
a fact, ín itself, but provides the basis for "knowing". He
considers knowledge of an objeet as the symbolic translation
of the behavioral possibilities toward that object as
experienced by the perceiver. If, in a community, there is a
communal way of dealing with reality, the need for
coordination of behavioral tendencies and, thus, for consensus
in knowledae will be felt. If an Individual has a positive
image of himself and an Evaluator has a negative image of PI
(in comparison with Pp), the Individual will not be able to
reconcile his own rapprochement-orientation to himself with
the contrary orientation of the Evaluator and will,
consequently, reject the Evaluator.
2.3. A model of social comparison
As explained in the previous paragraph, an Individual (I) is
subject to two simultaneous tendencies: to be like an Other,
and to differentiate himself from Other, in a positive sense.
Certain restrictions apply here. On the one hand, I will never
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wish to be completely identical to Other as this would mean
the abolition of his own identity (PI and P~ occupy the same
point). For this reason I will aim for the limit of equality,
so that PI and P~ are still, just, distinguishable from one
another. On the other hand, in his tendency to be
differentiated, I will never wish to fall outside the
collection of elements-endowed-with-significance (persons) to
which he himself and the comparison-Other both belong.
Bearing this in mind, Rijsman (1979b, in press, b) constructed
a model based on a linear scale on dimension dx, of -1 to tl,
in which -1 means that I is maximally inferior to Other and fl
that I is maximally superior to Other (within the bounds of
comparison). Point 0 indicates complete equality (actually,
the limit of complete equality). The tendency to be equal to
Other prescribes that the more inferior I is to Other, the
more he will try to increase the value of his position
(performance, possessions, etc.) and the more superior he is,
the more he will try to play down his position. This is
expressed in Figure 2-2, by the vectors (a) (the upward
vectors indicate the attempt to improve one's relative
position, the downward vectors the attempt to weaken one's
position in relation to Other). The tendency to differentiate
oneself from Other is 0 when PI is maximally superior and
grows stronger as PI becomes less superior and more inferior
in comparison with P~. mhis tendency is indicated by vectors
(b) in Figure 2-2. As the two tendencies operate
simultaneously in an individual, vectors (a) and (b) can be
added together.
The sum of (a) t(b) indicates the strength and the direction
in which I might attempt to alter his position, should he be
maximally inclined to compare himself with the Other. However,
this comparing only becomes maximal at the limit of equality
of PI with Pp. The tendency to compare oneself diminishes as
PI and P~ become more dissimilar. This is expressed by the
drawn line (c) in Figure 2-2. The sum of the vectors (a t b)
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~igure 2-2. Social comparison model.
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must be considered in the light of the tendency to compare
oneself with Other (c). The result c(a t b) indicates I's
eventual attempt to alter his position on dimension dx (see
drawn line)1).
The figure shows that I will not change his position in
relation to Other when PI is maximally superior or inferior
in the comparison with P~. (I does not compare himself with
Other in such cases). If PI is equal to P~ then I experiences
a strong inclination to improve his position in relation to
that of Other. This inclination is strongest when PI is only
just inferior to P~. This inclination disappears when PI is
rather superior to P~ and changes to a slight tendency for I
to weaken his position as PI increases in superiority, in
comparison with P~. (This applies up to maximal superiority
for PI at which point no further comparison is made).
The above is only applicable to situations in which I's
tendency to compare himself with Other is determined by
internal factors (i.e. how big the difference is between PI
and P~). However, if external factors are involved, for
instance, if an observer is comparing PI with P0, I can hardly
reduce the intensity of the comparison or put an end to it (in
cases of maximum difference). This is expressed by the dotted
line (c) in Figure 2-2. If the vectors (a t b) are considered
in conjunction with the intensity, as indicated by the dotted
line (c), I's tendency to alter his position on dimension dx
is as indicated by the dotted line c(a f b) in Figure 2-2
1) Footnote: Rijsman (1979b) derived a mathematical function
to express this result. If "y" is the force needed for PI
to shift from a certain point of comparison (in relation
to PD) to 0, the integrative tendency can be expressed as
y--x and the discriminative tendency as y--x t 1. The
sum of the two tendencies is thus y--2x t 1. The
inclination to compare oneself (c) can be expressed by the
function y- 1-~xG For -1 G x G 0, c(a t b) will be
y--2x2 - x f 1 and for ~ G x~ f 1, it will be y- 2x2 - 3x t 1.
y intercepts the x-axis when x--1, f~ and tl. y reaches
a maximum at -;x and a minimum at t'-,x.
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(see, also, Poppe and Rijsman, in press). This shows that I,
in such a situation, continues to alter his position in
relation to Other, even in cases of maximum difference.
The model has been described for the situation in which the
Individual compares himself, in each example, with one and the
same Other. As reported in 2.2. it is possible for I to change
his comparison-other. If he does so he will then change the
position of PI according to the outcome of the comparison with
the new comparison-Other. In this way it will be seen, for
example, that an Individual whose PI is clearly superior to Pp
will try to improve the position of PI relative to P~. The
reason for this is that I has meanwhile embarked on a
comparison of PI with a new P~, to whom PI is either inferior
or equal.
The social comparison model, as above, has been described as
part of Rijsman's recently formulated social motivation
theory. This theory provides a more extensíve basis and frame-
work for the comparison model previously (Rijsman, 1974;
Rijsman and Poppe, 1977) derived from Festinger's (1954)
theory of social comparison. The vectors (a) in Figure 2-2
indicate the "pressure toward uniformity" (Festinger's '
derivation D) and the vectors (b) a"pressure upward"
(Festinger's Hypothesis IV). Festinger's Hypothesis III ('The
tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person
decreasës as the difference between his opinion or ability
and one's own increases') is reproducèd in line (c) in the
model.
In order to test predictions from thís social comparison
model, a series of experiments was performed. These consisted
of giving subjects (students, in most of the expériments),
whose performance (a series of reaction times) had been
measured, bogus feedback about their performances. According
to this feedback some were slower and others faster than other
subjects whose reaction times had been measured simultaneously.
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In a third condition subjects were told that they were just
as fast as the other. The experiments were performed in two
settings. In some experiments (or parts of them) subjects
were put under relatively heavy pressure to compare them-
selves with the other (an observer-experimenter was present),
in others there was relatively little pressure (subjects were,
as far as possible, anonymous and in separate rooms). It was
predicted that, in both settings, the subjects who had been
informed that their performance was superior to Other's would
not speed up their reaction to the same extent as those who
had heard that their performance was the same as Other's or,
(for the 'heavy pressure' condition, only), inferior to
Other's. These predictions were confirmed in the majority of
experiments (see Rijsman, 1974; and Poppe and Rijsman, in
press, for a more detailed overview).
2.4. Elaboration of Rijsman's theory in the field of equity
and role distribution.
Rijsman (in press, a, b) has described a number of applications
and implications of the attribution-, comparison- and
validation principles described. we shall now describe two of
these, namely, equity and role distribution.
According to the equity norm, as formulated by Fdams (1965) an
individual will experience the outcomes he obtains for his
inputs as equitable when the ratio of his inputs and outcomes
corresponds to the inputs~outcomes ratio of an Other with
whose inputs and outcomes I can compare his own. Adams
expressed this in the formula:
Inputsl Inputsp
Outcomesl - outcomes~
mhis formula can be rewritten as:
Inputsl Outcomesl
Inputs0 - Outcomes~
The left-hand side of the f.ormula now consists of the inputs.
34
In fact, this side of the formula involves a comparison of PI
with P~. Individual (I) will want to have his subjective
opinion about the outcome of this equation validated. This
validation takes place by means of the outcomes which I can
interpret as an evaluation of the cues for PI and P~. I sees
as a correct validation an outcome ratio that exactly reflects
the input ratio. Furthermore, this interpretation of Adams'
views on equity reveals an aspect that was not mentioned by
Adams himself. In the course of comparing PI and P~, I will
strive to attain a certain superiority of PI, in relation to
P~. This means that he will attach a higher value to his own
inputs than to that of Other. P7aturally, he will want to find
the input ratio reflected in the ratio of the outcomes.
In a further examnle of social comparison and validation in
operation, Rijsman (in press, a, b) demonstrates the need for
role distribution in social interaction. If two interacting
individuals make mutual comparisons with one another on one
and the same dimension, this gives rise to the problem that
both wish to be superior to the Other, and to make it clear to
Other that he occupies an inferior position on the dimension.
This will lead to a negative reaction of the persons to one
another.
This problem does not arise when this one dimension is split
into two value dimensions and when the one is considered
important for the one individual and the second important for
the Other. If each of the two excels on his "own" dimension
then validation of Other's position on the other dimension
needs not present problems. Rijsman believes that this can only
happen when the two dimensions are complementary to one an-




A COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL MOTIVES
3.1. Introduction
In chapter 1 we remarked, among other things, that there are
many motives that can be used to describe the behavior of
subjects in mixed-motive games. Chapter 2 expounded the motive
of social comparison as a means of explaining interpersonal
behavior. In this third chapter we shall relate the social
comparison motive, using empirical methods, to the set of
motives mentioned in chapter 1. In this chapter we shall be
employing methods taken from cognitive psychology. These
methods offer the best way of studying the importance of the
various motives because adoptinq the single individual-intra-
personal approach makes it possible to minimize undesirable
influences such as strategic behavior and social approval. In
the following chapters we shall be examining the significance
of the various motives in situations involving interaction
between two individuals.
The influence of the social comparison motive is felt on the
competition-martyrdom axis of Figure 1-7, as on this axis the
issue is one of relatively higher or lower outcomes for a
person, in comparison with outcomes of an Other.
Evidence for the relative importance of the competition axis
in research at the cognitive level can be found in an article
by Maki, Thorngate and McClintock (1979).
In the second of the experiments they describe each subject is
presented with five series, each of 20 four-choice decomposed
games. The subject is told that a Chooser has consistently
made the same choice. He is shown this choice in 8 of the 20
games. In the remaining 12 games the subject is asked to
predict what choice the Chooser will make. The subjects were
distributed over eight conditions. In each condition the
Chooser, whose choice the subjects must predict, consistently
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chooses according to a different motive (individualism,
cooperation, altruism, martyrdom, masochism, sadomasochism,
aggression or competition). In this connection we were not,
in the first place, interested in the main conclusion that
some motives are easier to predict and to learn than others.
Of greater significance, here, is the information obtained
from two additional auestions posed after 100 games had been
completed. In one of these the subject was asked to indicate
what weight the Chooser attached to his own outcomes and to
those of Other. These weights ranged (after linear trans-
formation) from -4 (Chooser wanted to avoid giving cents to
Self (Other)) to t4 (Chooser wanted to give as many cents as
possible to Self (Other)). One would expect the weights gíven
by subjects who had to predict that the motive was "compe-
tition" to fall in the quadrant of positive weights for
Chooser and negative weights for Other. This was, indeed, the
case. But this same quadrant also contained the weights
allocated by the subjects asked to predict "individualism"
and "aggression". On the other hand, not only the weights
allocated by the subjects who had to predict "martyrdom" but
also those weights pertaining to "altruism" and "masochism"
fall in the quadrant of negative weights for Chooser and
positive weightsfor Other. Those subjects who had succeeded
in predicting that the motive was "cooperation" or "sado-
masochism" also allocated the correct weights to the outcomes
for Self and Other. However, those who did not succeed in
learning that the motive to be predicted was "cooperation" or
"sadomasochism" allocated weiRhts in the same quadrant as the
weights given by subjects who had had to predict "compe-
tition", "individualism" or "aggression". In general terms
this means that the subjects who were unable to figure out
which motive had to be predicted allocated weights which were
positive for one of the two persons (Self or Other) and
negative for the other person. This bias is even evident in
several subjects who did succeed in predicting what the motive
was. (An exception to this tendency are subjects who had to
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predict "GOmpetition"or "martyrdom". In their case it would
not be right to sneak of a bias since the correct weights for
them actually fall in the positive~negative and negative~
positive quadrants, respectively). This indicates that there
must be rather a strong tendency to see the outcomes of Chooser
and Other as being negatively correlated, and points to the
significance of the competition dimension, or, in other words,
the social comparison motive.
The subjects were also asked to rate the Chooser on 22 9-point
bipolar adjective scales, such as impolite-polite, active-
passive, ungenerous-generous, kind-unkind, calm-agitated,
punishes self-punishes other, stable-unstable, selfish-
unselfish, just-unjust. A discriminant function analysis
performed on the ratings resulted in only one significant
discriminant function, which accounted for 48.38 of the
discriminatory power of the battery of derived functions.
According to this function, Choosers are ordered along the
dimension in three groups: a) competition, aggression and
individualism; b) sadomasochism and cooperation and c)
martyrdom, masochism and altruísm. The exact location of group
centroids is reproduced in Figure 3-4. The overall tendency
is for the sequence to coincide with the projection of the
motives on the competition dimension.
Despite the fact that the study by Maki c.s. provides some
clear indications of the relative importance of the compe-
tition-axis, it has not yet been conclusively demonstrated
that the competition-axis is, even in general terms, of
relatively greater significance than the cooperation-,
individualism- and altruism-axes. A possible explanation of
the findings of Maki c.s. is that they may have carried out
their research with subjects who were predominantly motivated
by competition. If, however, they had carried out the same
study with subjects who were motivated by, for instance,
cooperation, they would perhaps have found bias in the
direction of the axis which is perpendicular to the compe-
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tition-axis.
I~ the study to be reported here we shall examine whether this
last suoposition, namely, that when evaluating the choices
made by others, people display a bias in the direction of
their own dominant motivation, is correct. Or whether the
competition-axis is, in fact, the most important one, regard-
less of the evaluators' dominant motivation.
For the purposes of this study it is not necessary to have
the subjects learn the choices of one or more Choosers prior
to the experiment. We can inform them directly what the
choice of a certain Chooser was. we can situate these choices
in a circle around the midpoint or some other point in a set
of coordinates, as shown in Figure 1-7. There is, however, a
gooà reason for not taking the midpoint of the set of
coordinates as the center of the circle. This is because if
the two main axes have identically graduated scales (as is
the case in Figure 1-7) the cooperation-masochism axis will
then automatically indicate the alternatives that would
yield equal outcomes for Chooser and Other. This would mean
that the goals ascribed to alternatives along the cooperation-
sadomasochism axis would coincide with the equality motive.
For this reason the midpoint of the set of coordinates will
not be taken as the center of the circle.
Apart from the influence of the equality motive, we shall also
attempt to minimize the effect of the equity motive. According
to the latter motive, the outcomes for two peonle would tia~~e
to be in proportion to their respective inputs. The influence
of the equity motive can be minimized by constructing the
situation in such a 4ray that there are no inputs, or by
introducing an element of chance.
After due consideration of these last points we opted for a
study in which subjects were confronted with a hypothetical
situation, namely, a lottery being held in 9 different states
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Figure 3-1. Structure of motivation axes and
choice alternatives.
coin is tossed to decide which of the two can choose one of
the nine alternatives, each of which will yield a certain sum
of money to the Chooser and the other prizewinner. The nine
choices can be seen in Figure 3-1, filled in on a set of
coordinates similar to that in Figure 1-7. As can be seen, the
alternative of ~1100 for the Chooser and ~ 900 for the Other
has been taken as center of the eight remaining points, which
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all lie approximately in a circle around this center.
It so happens that, in every state, the person who is allowed
to choose selects a different alternative. The subject is
asked to indicate, on a 9- ~oint scale, how (dis)siTMilar he
considers the goals of two Choosers, taking a different pair
of Choosers per evaluation.
If it is social comparison that is the subjects' main motive
then one will expect the goals associated with the alter-
natives on the competition-axis to be seen as relatively less
similar and those associated with alternatives on the cooper-
ation-axis as relatively more similar. The result will be that
the circular structure in Figure 3-1 will be altered on the
basis of the evaluationsof similarity as regards the respective
goals, and will be elongated to an ellipse with its longest
axis following the competition-axis. This must hold true,
irrespective of the subject's own dominant motivation. If the
subject's dominant motivation is significant, here, one will
still see an elliptical figure but this time the longest axis
will follow the axis indicating the subject's dominant
motivation.
An essential part of this study is the determination of the
dominant motivation of the subjects. The current way of doing
this, since 1975, has been a classification method, as
described by Kuhlman a Marshello (1975a). According to this
method the subjects are presented with a series of 3-choice
decomposed games. These games are of 4 different types. In
one type, for instance, the individualism, competition and
cooperation motives each lead to the choice of a different
alternative (triple dominance type). In another, the
individualism and competition motive prompts the choice of a
certain alternative, cooperation leads to the choice of a
second alternative and the third alternative is undetermined
(PDG type). If the subject demonstrates a certain degree of
consistency in his choices in all four t~~pes o~ came, for
example, consistent c~oice of the individualistic altarnative,
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it is assumed that this subject's dominant motivation is
individualism.
The following comr.ments relate to the reliability and validity
of the classification procedure: Kuhlman and Marshello (1975a)
showed that the chance of ascribing a certain dominant
motivation to someone who chooses in a random fashion is
relatively small. Using criteria that were not too stringent,
they found that less than 58 of the subjects could be
expected, on the basis of chance alone, to be classified in
one of the three categories, "individualistic", "competitive"
or "cooperative". Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) demonstrated
that there is a high degree of consistency in the choices of
experimental subjects. Kuhlman and Marshello (1975a) and
Bennett and Carbonari (1976) found that there is a difference
in personality characteristics between groups of subjects
with different dominant motivations as determined by the
classification procedure. Furthermore, it seems that
categories of subjects differentiated by the classification
procedure have different expectations about the behavior of
others in experimental games (KUhlman S Wimberley, 1976) and
even differ in their behavior in response to a certain
strategy of the Other in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (KUhlman
8~ Marshello, 1975b.).
As a second criterion to classify the dominant motives of the
subjects in this study, we shall make use of the choices in
five Commons Dilemmas. A Commons Dilemma (see also Dawes,
McTavish and Shaklee, 1977) can be considered as equivalent
to a decomposed Prisoner's Dilemma for 2 or more persons.
Each of the members of a group makes, independently of the
others, a choice between two alternatives, both of which have
consequences for the outcomes of the person himself and for
each of the other members of the group. The one alternative
(Cooperation) yields a small reward for the person who
chooses it and a small fine for the others. The other
alternative (Defection) yields a large reward for the Chooser
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and a large fine for the others. Each of the members obtains
the highest outcomes if all of them make the C-choice. If one
person chooses D while the others choose C, the chooser of D
will increase his own outcomes at the expense of the others'
outcomes. However this relative advantage for the D-chooser
diminishes when more members of the group make a D-choice. If




Participants in the study were 69 female and 29 male under-
graduates at the University of California, in Santa Barbara
(ages approximately 18 to 22). Particípation in the study
earned credits for the subjects, as part of a requirement for
their introductory course in psychology.
3.2.2. Procedurel)
The study consisted of four parts, namely, a) a study of the
Commons Dilemma, b) a classification of the subjects according
to the Kuhlman and Marshello (1975b) method, c) a series of
evaluations in which subjects indicated the degree of
(dis)similarity beti.-een the motives prompting the choices of two
hypothetical Choosers (per evaluatíon) and d) rating some of
these choices on a number of scales. The four parts were
carried out in this order and in direct succession. For the
first part, random groups of 5 subjects were composed2).
Although this was not necessary, these groups were left
intact, for practical reasons, during the remain-ng three
parts of the study.
Footnote 1): The studv reported here has been carried out in
combination with a study by Fran ~alarowski on the Commons
P,ilemma. ~his latter study related to parts a) and b).
Footnote 2): If a subject in a group failed to show up his
place was taken by a stooge so that the total of 5 per group
was assured.
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Ad a) Commons Dilemmas
A video monitor was used to instruct the subjects that they
were to make a number of choices, each of which would yield
outcomesfor themselves and for the other members of the group.
An example of a Commons Dilemma was shown on the monitor and
the consequences of the possible choices were explained.
Further, subjects were told that one of the Dilemmas would be
selected at random and that the members of the group would be
paid according to their choices in that Dilemma. Subjects
then proceeded to make a choice in each of five Dilemmas. The
5 Commons Dilemmas that were used have been included as
Appendix 1. This appendix contains an example of a pay off-
structure of one of the Dile~mas, too.
Ad b) Classification
In this part of the study the instructions were again
presented by video monitor. Subjects were told that for this
part of the study each participant would be randomly paired
with another participant. The other participant might be a
member of his own group or one of the other groups that had
participated or were going to participate in the study. A 3-
choice decomposed game was shown on the video monitor and an
explanation was given about the outcomes that a certain
choice by the person himself plus a choice by the other of
the pair would yield. The subject was asked to write down his
first choice for each of the 24 situations. These 24 games
are 12 games taken from Kuhlman and 2iarshello (1975b). ~ach of
the qames was repeated once. The 12 decomposed qames that were
used can be seen in Aooendix 2.
Ad c) Comparisons
Each person was given a form with the following instructions:
For ~his task you will be provided information concerning
the behac~i~r of lottery winners in nine states. In each
state there were actually two winners, and by a flip of
a coin one of the winners in each state was permitted to
choose one of nine different wavs to reward hi:~self and
the ot:~er w,inner in his state. The nine alternative ways
to rewar3 self and others were the same in each state,
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81100 51700 5300 51700 ~1100 ~1100 ~500 51900 ~ 500
~ 100 ~1500 5900 ~ 300 ~ 900 ~1700 ~300 ~ 900 51500
After careful deliberation, each decision maker in each
state chose a different one of the nine alternative ways
to award sums of money to himself and the other winner in
his state.
The actual choices are given below:
Allocation chosen
self other
State A ~1100 ~ 900
State B ~ 500 ~1500
State C ~1100 ~ 100
State D ~1700 ~ 300
State E á1900 ~ 900
State F ~1700 ~1500
State G 51100 51700
State H 8 500 ~ 300
State I ~ 300 ~ 900
We know that the chooser in each state had some goals in
mind when he chose one of the nine ways to allocate the
rewards to self and other wínner in his state. Your task
is to indicate how similar or different you believe the
nine choosers' goals were to one another. To help you
make these judgments of similarity, we will ask you to
rate how similar or dissimilar you believe each chooser's
goals were to each of the other choosers' goals, based
upon their choices. It is important to remember that the
chooser in each state could select any one of the nine
different combinations of rewards for self and for other.
In evaluating the similarity of the goals of two choosers
in two states, it is important to consider both the
rewards the choosers selected for themselves and others,
and the rewards they could have chosen but did not. In
each of the following tables vou will notice that the
preferred choices by the decision makers in two states
are circled. Your job is to judge how similar you believe
the goals of these two decision makers were. Below each
table there is a 9-point scale ranging from very dis-
similar to very similar. Mark an X to indicate where your
judgment concerning the similarity of the decision
makers' qoals falls on this scale. Remember, always make
your evaluation in terms of what choices the decision
makers made and did not make.
After this the nine stimuli were presented randomly, in pairs:
The two alternatives circled below represent the choices
of two of the nine state winners. Rate the degree of
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similarity between the goals of these two choosers based
upon the alternative they selected from the nine which




~1100 ~1700 5300 ~1700 ~1100 ~110 5500 1900 ~ 500
~ 100 ~1500 ~900 ~ 300 ~ 900 5170 ~300 900 ~1500
The goals of these choosers were:
very dissimilar - - - - - - - - - very similar.
And thus all 36 pairs of choices. Half of the subjects were
shown the pairs in reverse order.
Ad d) Ratings
Finally, the subjects were given three of the 9 alternatives
and asked to indícate the relevance of a number of
descriptions of the Chooser's motives. Each subject received
the ~1100~~900 alternative plus two choices relating to one
of the axes in Figure 3-1. This axis was determined at
random. The form appeared as follows:
The choices of three of the state winners are circled
below. As described previously, each of these choices
affords rewards to self and to other state winner. Please
review carefully the reward Chooser 1 afforded himself
and the other winner in this state (other person), as
well as the rewards the chooser could have but did not
afford self and other. After this review, please fill out
the scales listed underneath Chooser 1, and then do the
same for Chooser 2 and Chooser 3. Use an X for each scale
to indicate how the chooser's goals can be described on
that scale. Please make a rating on every scale.
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1. Chooser 1: ALTEiddF,TIVFS INlTIALI.Y AVAIIABIE
Giving Himself
Giving other person
51100 ~1700 ;300 ~1700 ~1100 ~1100 ~500 ~1900 ~ 500
~ 100 ;1500 ~900 ~ 300 ~ 900 51700 ~300 ; 900 ~1500
Aggressive ........ not at all very much
Martyr-like ....... not at all - - - - - - - - - very much
Individualistic ... not at all ve much- - - - - - - - - ~
Sadomasochistic ... not at all - - - - - - - - - vexy nuch
Altruistic ........ not at all - - - - - - - - - vexy mic~,h
Co~etitive ....... not at all - - - - - - - - - very much
Masoc~.histic ....... not at all - - - - - - - - - veYy much
Cooperative ....... not at all - - - - - - - - - very much
Self-sacrifying ... not at all ve m~r11- - - - - - - - - ~
Sadistic .......... not at all - - - - --- - - very much
Selfish ........... not at all - - - - - - - - - very much
Equalitarian ...... not at all - - - - - - - - - vezy much
The same for Chooser 2 and Chooser 3.
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Classification-of-subjects
The 24 games are made up of 4 types, each type consisting
of 3 games each of which is presented twice. A subject was
allocated to a particular category if he made the choice
appropriate to that category in at l~ast four of the 6
games in each type. According to this criterion 55 of the
98 subjects could be classífied as being predominantly
motivated by altruism, cooperation, individualism or
competition.
Table 3-1 shows the distribution, per sex, of these motiva-
tional attitudes.
In order to obtain the best possible guarantee that the
subjects to be included in the analysis did, indeed, have
the motivational attitudes ascribed to them, a second
selection criterion was applied, namely, the number of
48
cooperative choices made in the 5 Commons Dilemmas. The
figures in brackets in Table 3-1 show the numbers of subjects
who also met this second criterion. The two criteria overlap
to a certain extent (x2 - 3.54, p- 0.07). As can be seen
from Table 3-1, 33 subjects apparently met both criteria,
these subjects representing eight from each sub-group, with
the exception of the altruists, nine of whom met both
criteria.
In order to keep the four sub-groups equal in size one
subject, chosen at random, was dropped from the latter group.
Men ~TOmen Total
Altruistic 1( 0) 17 ( 9) 18 ( 9)
Cooperative 7( 4) 7( 4) 14 ( 8)
Individualistic 6~( 4) 5( 4) 11 ( 8)
Competitive 5( 4) 7( 4) 12 ( 8)
Not classifiable
19 (12) 36 (21) 55 (33)
10 33 43
Total 29 69 98
Table 3-1. Distribution, per sex, of subjects according to
motivational orientation. (Figures in brackets refer to the
number of subjects with 3 or more cooperative choices (for
Altruistic and Cooperative) or 2 or less cooperative choices
(for Individualistic and Competitive) in the 5 Commons
Dilemma games) .
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Figure 3-2. INDSCAL structure.
3.3.2. Comparisons of-the-goals
The (dis)similarity evaluationsby the subjects were subjected
to an INDSCAL analysis (Carroll 8~ Chang, 1970), for which a
computer program of the MDS(X) series was used. This makes
it possible to calculate, per subject, the mean correlation
between the subject's original data and the scaling results.
Even if only one dimension is singled out in the analysis,
the mean correlation for all subjects is still 0.70. This
correlation rises to 0.86 when a two-dimensional solution is
decíded upon. The relative importance of the two dimensions
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can be seen from the ratio of the values eigenvalue ~tJ for
each of the two dimensions. These values are 0.724 and 0.358,
respectively, which means that dimension 1 can be considered
approximately twice as important as dimension 2. This two-
dimensional solution is shown in Fiqure 3-2.
It appears that the alternatives in Figure 3-2 scattered into
3 sub-qroups: group A, made up of the points Cmp, Ind and
Agr, group B, made up of the points Mrt, Alt and "4as, and
group C, made up of the points Cop, Sdm and Cnt. The first
and most important dimension in the structure is determined
by group B's differentiation from group A, leaving group C
in an intermediate position. The second dimension emerges
through group C's differentiation from group A, with group B
occupying the intermediate position.
The structure reproduced in Figure 3-2 is a mean structure
for all subjects. The structure actually differs, slightly,
from one subject to another, since each of the two dimensions
has different weights for each subject. mhese weiahts are
reported in Figure 3-3. It is also clear, from this figure,
that dimension 1 is more important than dimension 2.
This is because the majority of points tie on the right
hand side below the bisector dividing the quadrant into two
egual parts.
We examined whether the altruistically, cooperatively,
individualistically and competitively oriented subjects
differed from one anot;zer with respect to their positions in
Figure 3-3. To this end we calculated, per subject, among
other thinqs, the ratio between the weight on dimension 1 and
on dimension 2. A non-parametric analysis of variance
(Kruskal - Wallis) was carried out on these ratios. No
differences were found between the groups (X2 - 4.05, n.s.).
Partly because of the large variances within the groups,








~--i 1 1 1 1 1
-.2 .2 .4 .6 .8 1.0
dimension 1
Figure 3-3. Weights of subjects on INDSCAL dimensions.
(~ - Competitor; ~ - Individualist
O - Cooperator; p - Altruist)
3.3.3. The-ratings-of-the-choices
As reported, each of the 98 participants in the study was
confronted with 3 of the 9 choices and asked to indicate how
relevant each of 12 labels was to the goals associated with
the choices. In this way four groups were formed. One aroup
evaluated the goals associated with the choices Ind, Cnt
and Mas, a second group the aoals belongina to the choices
52
Cop, Cnt and Sdm, a third group the goals belon~?ing to the
choices Alt, Cnt and Agr and a fourth group the goals
belonging to the choices Cmp, Cnt and Mrt. The evaluations
of the goals belonging to the choice Cnt were not taken into
consideration for the purpose of the analysis. Fach of the
four groups was randomly divided into two equal sub-groups.
The data,for one of the two remaining choices was taken
from one sub-group and the data for the other choice from
the second sub-group. This procedure yielded 8 randomly
selected sub-groups, each of which evaluated the goals of
one of the eight choices, according to the relevance of
twelve different labels. The numbers per sub-group are given
in Table 3-2. The numbers in the sub-groups in Table 3-2 are
not all identical because of the random allocation of the
subjects to the groups and because, in cases of missing data,
the subject concerned is dropped from the analysis. The
latter reason explains why the total number of subjects in
Table 3-2 is 91 instead of 98. The classification of the
subjects according to their dominant motivation was left out
of consideration in this section of the results, in view of













Self Other analysis I analysis II
(51900; ~ 900) 7 10
(~1700; 81500) 12 11
(~1100; ~1700) 14 14
(~ 500; ~1500) 10 14
(~ 300; ~ 900) 9 8
(S 500; ~ 300) 12 12
(~1100; ~ 100) 14 13
(~1700; ~ 300) 13 9
91 91
Table 3-2. Numbers of subjects per choice to evaluate.
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A discriminant function analysis was performed on the scores
of these eight groups, each of which evaluated a different
choice. This analysis revealed a single discriminative
function which accounted for 79.88 of the discriminative
power of all the derived functíons (Wilks' Lambda (66) -
0.2249, p ~ 0.001).
In order to obtain some idea of the internal consistency of
the data, a second discriminant function analysis was carried
out. This was performed on the evaluations of the points
which had been omitted from the first analysis. Besides
yielding a primary siqnificant function, accounting for
69.68 of the discriminative power (Wilks' Lambda (66) -
O.I716, p G 0.001) this second analysis also revealed a second
significant function which accounted for 16.08 of the
discriminative power (Wilks' Lambda (50) - 0.3870, p~ 0.01).
This second function, a difficult one to interpret, was not
found, however, in the first analysis, and therefore, will
not be given further consideration in this study. Figure 3-4
shows the group centroids on the first dimensions. The rank
correlations between the positions on the two dimensions
is 0.83 (p - 0.01).
For the points with positive discriminant function scores,
labels "martyrlike", "equalitarian", "self-sacrifying" (in the
second analysis), "cooperative" (in the first analysis) and
"masochístic" (in the second analysis) were considered appro-
priate. The labels considered relevant to the points with neg-
ative discriminant function scores were "competitive" (in the
first analysis), "selfish" and especially, "aggressive". (See
Appendix 3 for standardised discriminant function coefficients).
3.4. Discussion
what strikes one, first and foremost, in the analysis of the
(dis)similarity scores and the analysis of the labeling scores
in the high degree of conformity between the results of the
analyses. Obviously, a high degree of similarity can be
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expected between the two discriminant function analyses of
the labeling scores, as the data in these two analyses are
not independent of one another. While the results of the
INDSCAL analysís came from the same subjects, they were
obtained by a very different method. In order to make a true
comparison with the results of the discriminant function
analysis, an INDSCAL analysis was made of the (dis)similarity
scores ascribed to the goals belonging to the eight choices
lying off-center in the structure shown in Figure 3-1. The
INDSCAL structure yielded by these 8 choices is virtually
identical to that of the 9 choices. The first dimension of
the analysis of the structures of the 8 choices is presented
together with the results of the discriminant function
analysis in Figure 3-4, for the purpose of comparison.
Figure 3-4 also shows the results of the discriminant
function analysis of the second experiment by Maki,
McClintock and Thorngate (1979). On each of the four
dimensions, the points scatter, forming three groups. These
three groups are: a) Cmp, Agr, Ind; b) Cop and Sdm; and c)
Alt, Mrt and Mas. The three groups lie, each time, in the
same sequence. A comparison of the points within the groups
reveals many transpositions. However, in a comparison between
groups there is only one instance of a point from the one
group being exchanged for a point from the other group. (This
exception is the transposition of Alt and Sdm in discriminant
function analysis I).
The rank correlations of the positions on the four dimensions
range from 0.76 to 0.95. With the exception of the lowest
correlation, which is significant at 58, all the rest are
significant at the 1~ level. The dimension can be interpreted
as follows. The points Cmp, Agr and Znd indicate the
alternatives in which Chooser's outcomes are higher than
Other's. The opposite is true at points Alt, Mrt and tilas:
Other receives more than the Chooser himself. The points Cop
and Sdm are the alternatives in which the outcomes of Chooser
and Other are most similar to one another. This was reported
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Figure 3-4. Overview of results of the INDSCAL (a) and
discriminant function analysis (b and c) from the present
study and from the study by Maki c.s. (1979) (d).
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by Maki c.s. (1979, pp. 214-215) and is, likewise, clearly
applicable to our own study. In its totality the dimension
can be interpreted according the line: me more than Other,
both the same, Other more than me. One can justifiable speak
of a social comparison dimension, here. In this connection
it seems worthwhile taking a look at the second dimension of
the INDSCAL analysis, which can be interpreted as a dimension
of equality versus inequality. The question arises as to
whether or not the first dimension (more for me versus more
for Other) might partially be determined by the presence of
alternatives which contain a degree of equality in outcomes.
To examine this at greater depth, an INDSCAL analysis was
made of only those choices situated on the axes of the
Griesinger and Livingston (1973) model (the points Ind, Alt,
Mas and Agr). Here, again, the dimension of the points Ind
and Agr versus Alt and Mas emerges as the first dimension
(which is at least twice as important as the second dimension)
and, as second dimension, the one formed by the points Ind and
Alt versus Mas and Agr. Once again the first dimension under-
lines the social comparison dimension. It justifies the
proposition that, in psychology, it is more appropriate to
consider the diagonals in the model as the primary structure.
In general, it is difficult to exclude from consideration an
equality dimension, which always runs parallel to the Sdm-Cop
diagonal. This is not only true in the empirical sense but
also from the theoretical point of view. In chapter 2 we have
already explained that social comparison is determined by
tendencies towards equality and towards inequality.
The results of the INDSCAL analysis of the choices Ind, Alt,
Mas and Agr also provide part of the solution to another
noticeable problem. In the structure of rigure 3-1 the
alternatives have been selected in such a way that they lie
in a circle with the 51100~~900 alternative as its midpoint.
If, however, the distances between alternatives on the same
axis are compared, it appears that between the alternatives
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Ind and Mas there is a difference of 81900 -;300 -;1600 in
Chooser's own profit. The difference between the alternatives
on the altruism axis is ~1700 -~100 -~1600 in profit for
Other. On the competition axis the difference is (~1700-5300)
-(~500-51500) -~2400 difference in relative profit and on
the cooperation axis the difference is (~1700t~1500) -
(;500t~300) -~2400 difference in joint profit. This means
that the differences along the competition and cooperation
axes are greater than those along the individualism and
altruism axes. This could be an explanation of the finding
that the competition axis and the cooperation axis are the
two most important dimensions encountered in the INDSCAL
analysis. However, it fails to explain why these two axes are
also the major dimensions in the INDSCAL analysis of the four
choices Ind, Alt, Mas and Agr.
A remarkable point in the INDSCAL results for the similarity
data on the comparison of the motives associated with the
various choices, is the lack of any difference between the
altruistically, cooperatively, individualistically and
competitively oriented sub-groups which were included in the
study. In this connection it may be of interest to report one
of the author's own experiences. It happened on two occasions
that a subject was missing from a group of five and that the
author himself acted as fifth man. In this situation he, too,
was given the task of scoring the nine goals on the basis of
(dis)similarity. D7aturally, he was very familiar with the
objective structure shown in fiaure 3-1 and attempted to
determine the 36 evaluations of (dis)similarity in such a way
that they would coincide with this objective structure. This
appeared to be a virtually impossible task. Long after the
subjects had departed he was still racking his brains over
this problem, whereas the subjects had completed their
scoring in a relatively short period of time. This means that
they must have worked with a certain bias, a certain criterion
that was used when allocating scores. The obvious assumption
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is that this criterion must have been their own dominant
motivation. In fact, the salience of this motivation was
reinforced by the fact that directly before the comparison
of the motives, the 32 selected subjects had actually made
highly consistent choices for a particular motive, in the
two classification tasks. This might have created a set for
this motive. In the implicit structure of motives, as
reflected in the results of the INDSCAL analysis, this
motivational set does not appear to be involved. This
amounts, in fact, to a further underlining of the sali0nce
of the social comparison dimension, which emerges as the
major dimension in each of the four sub-groups.
This chapter has demonstrated how important the social
comparison dimension is in the cognition of experimental
subjects. In the following chapter we shall see whether the




ASYMMETRY IN OUTCOMi. STRUCTURE AND POSSIBILITIES OF CHANGING
THE STRUCTURE AS DETERf7INANTS OF ACTUAL CHANGES ZN THE OUT-
COME STRUCTURE.
4.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter it was demonstrated that on an intra-
personal cognitive level social comparison plays a role in
(3is)similarity judgments on goals associated with certain
choices. However, if the aim is to give greater generality to
social comparison as the explanatory principle, one should
demonstrate its functioning not only on the intrapersonal
cognitive level, but also on a behavioral level, not only for
the individual but for the interaction between two (or more)
individuals as well. That social comparison is important in
the behavior of non-interacting individuals was demonstrated
by Rijsman (1974), Poppe and Rijsman (in press) and Syroit and
Rijsman (in press). The significance of the social comparison
motive for two persons interacting with one another was shown
in an article by Rijsman and Poppe (1977). They show how
Messick and Thorngate's (1967) finding that avoidance of
relative loss is a stronger motivational force than approach
to relative gain, and how Marwell, Ratcliff and Schmitt's
(1969) finding that choices in a MDG can be based upon equity
motives, can all be integrated in the social comparison model.
Rijsman and Poppe further describe a study in which predictions
on choices in a MDG are deduced from social comparison theory.
The matrices they employ are shown in Figure 4-1.
An inspection of the structures (matrices) in Figure 4-1 shows
that Person A in matrix 8~6 is in a favorable position. He
always receives 2 units more than B for a corresponding choice.
That means that Person A may easily obtain a lead in the out-
comes, whereas B may obtain a backlog.
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tdatrix 6~6 Matrix 8~6 Matrix 8~8
Fiaure 4-1. Matrices 6~6, 8~6 anc? 3~8.
Within the framework of Rijsman's comparison model this
implies that Person B will relatively often choose alternative
D, which sets bounds to his backlog. Person A can choose
alternative D less often. Were he to choose D too often, he
might obtain a lead exceeding the limits of comparability.
That means that B will make more D-choices than A. The persons
in the symmetrical matrices 6~6 and 8~8 will continuously try
to obtain a lead in total score, or eventually try to
eliminate a backlog. The result will be a great number of D-
choices. The findings of the experiment, reported by Rijsman
and Poppe, were in accord with these deductions from the
social comparison model. Choosers in the superior position in
the asymmetrical 8~6 matrix made a D-choice in 52.58 of their
choices, whereas choosers in the inferior position did so in
66.0~ of their choices. The percentages of D-choice in the 6~6
and 8~8 matrices were respectively 77.0 and 81.5. It thus
follows from this study that social comparison takes place as
to the outcomes determined b;~ the entries of the matrix and by
the choices made by subjects within the framework of that
matrix. In this chapter we will investigate whether social
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comparison also a~plies to the cell entries of the matrix
themselves. We will do that by checking whether subjects do
actually and systematically change the cell entries when given
an opportunity to do so. Before clarifying the meaning of
social comparison theory in this domain, it is necessary first
to make an analysis of the components out of which the matrix
has been built up.
As far as we know, the only experiment reported in the
literature in which changes in the matrix entries are used as
a dependent measure, is the experiment of Slack and Cook
(1973). They composed three kinds of subject couples: both
subjects a high F-score (high authoritarianism), both a low
F-score, or one with a high and the other a low F-score. All
couples were presented the same PDG matrix whose entries they
could change according to certain rules. ~lack and Cook found
in this exploratory study that the three groups of subjects
differed on the indices which could be deduced from the
changed matrices. Here, we are most interested in the sort of
indices which were used. The more important of these indices
also appear in the very detailed analytical framework
described by I:elley and Thibaut (1978). They analyze the
matrix entries in a number of components. We will describe
these components by means of th.e matrix 13~13 in Figure 4-2.
The analysis is done separately for each of the two persons.
In the outcomes for a certain person we first of all discern
a general mean. Kelley and Thibaut call this the Grand Mean
(GM). GM for Person A in matrix 13~13 is (13t8t12t8)!4 - 10.25.
A second component discerned by Kelley and Thibaut is the
Reflexive Control (RC), that is the control which a person
exerts upon his own outcomes. Person A in matrix 13~13 can
obtain an average of (13t8)~2 - 10.50 units with alternative
al, and an average of (12t8)~2 - 10.00 units with alternative
a2. mhe RC is therefore 10.50 - 10.00 - 0.50. In each of the
cells of the favorable alternative al 0.25 is entered for A,
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Figure 4-2. Matrices 13~13 and 15~11 and the.decomposition in components according to
Kelley and Thibaut (1978).
























































FCB - 6.50 BCB - 0.50
(FC'B - 2.50)
whereas in each of the cells of the unfavorable alternative a2
-0.25 is entered.
Besides A himself, B also exerts a certain control upon the
outcomes which A can achieve. This is indicated by Kelley and
Thibaut as Fate Control (FC). When B chooses bl, then A gets
an average of (13f12)~2 - 12.50 and if B chooses alternative
b2, then A gets an average of (8t8)~2 - 8.00 units. FC for A
is therefore 12.50 - 8.00 - 4.50. In each of the cells of the
favorable alternative bl 2.25 is entered for A and -2.25 in
each of the cells of the unfavorable alternative b2.
GM, RC and FC together do not yet form the total matrix which
is to be analyzed. The difference is shown in the last partial
matrix and is indicated as Behavior Control (BC). Behavior
Control is the joint influence which A and B can exert upon
the possible outcomes for one person. In order to achieve an
entry of 0.25 for BC, A must choose al when B chooses bl, or
a2 when B chooses b2. BC for Person A is 0.50.
The analysis for Person A in matrix 13~13 is shown in Figure
4-2. This same figure also shows the components into which
matrix 15~11 can be analyzed for each of the two persons.
In Kelley and Thibaut's analysis, FC refers to the influence
which the other can exert upon the possible outcomes for a
given person. In this chapter, however, we start from the
opposite perspective and use the term FC', which refers to the
influence which a given person can exert upon the possible
outcomes for the other. Thus RC, FC' and BC, respectively
stand for the influence which a person has upon his own out-
comes, upon the outcomes for the other and, together with the
other, upon his own outcomes.
Slack and Cook (1973) indicate GM, RC and FC', respectively as
Environmental Wealth, Power of Economic Self Control and Power
of Economic Other Control. Kelley and Thibaut also explain the
meaninq of the relations between those components. For example,
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RC and FC are concordant in the matrices of Figure 4-2 because
the most favorable choice of RC for one person is at the same
time the most favorable choice for the other. As can be seen
in Fiaure 4-2, A and B also have a certain amount of Behavior
Cóntrol over each other. This is indicated as Mutual Behavior
Control (MBC). In matrix 13~13 Mutual Behavior Control is
correspondent. This stems from the fact that the cell entries
for BC are positively correlated between the two persons.
Although the qualitative properties (like concordance and
correspondence) are essential for full understanding of the
matrix, in this study attention is restricted to the changes
which the subjects bring about in the components. The reason
is that these components can actually serve as a basis for
social comparison between the subjects. Moreover, the
qualitative properties of a matrix can only be changed via a
change in the cell entries of the matrix, and such changes
necessarily imply changes in the components of the matrix.
Figure 4-2 not only comprises the analysis of the symmetrical
matrix 13~13, but also of the asymmetrical matrix 15~11.Part of
the subjects was given matrix 13~13 and an other part matrix
15~11. All subjects received an opportunity to change the
matrix. In each of the 10 trials of the experiment, subjects
were allowed to change upwards or downwards one of their own
cell entries and one cell entry of the other subject. The
changes were not fixed, but were restricted to a certain
maximum per condition.
On the basis of social comparison theory, it is to be expected
that subjects in the superior starting-position in matrix
15!11 (i.e. Person A) will make weaker attempts to improve
their GM and FC' than subjects in the inferior starting-
position in matrix 15~11 and than subjects in the starting-
position of equality in matrix 13~13. The subjects in the
inferiar starting-position will try to reduce their backlog in
GM and FC'. The subjects in the symmetrical matrix will try to
reach a better position than their interactíon partner in the
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matrix with respect to GM, FC' and RC. With respect to RC, the
two persons in the asymmetrical matrix are in a position of
equality and both will try to achieve a certain advantage in
the comparison.
It is very unlikely that social comparison phenomena will show
up in the changes in Behavior Control, as this component
reflects the influence which the two persons combined have
upon the outcomes for one of them. Reflexive Control and Fate
Control, too, are more specific components of the mutual
relationship than the general mean (Grand Mean) is. Any
attempt to change RC or FC' has a direct impact upon GM. How
changes in the mutual comparison positions actually take place
has to be found out. It is possible,namely, to alter the Self-
Other relation for GM, RC and FC' ín several ways: adding and~
or subtracting units from one's own and~or the other's
entries. It is important to know the rules by which the
changing of matrix entries was restricted. For some
subjects, the changes made by one person to the matrix (to an
entry of his own and of the other) were restricted to the same
maximum as the changes that the other person could make. In
this condition, namely both persons having the same
possibilities for making changes, the maximum change per trial
was 2 units. Thus each of the two persons could change one of
his own entries to the maximum of 2 units and one entry of
the other person by a maximum of 2 units. In other conditions,
the maxima set were 3 for one person and 1 for the other, so
that one person had superior possibilities of changing than
the other, who had inferior possibilities.
The two variables, starting-position and changing
possibilities, were put together in a 3 x 3 design represented
in Table 4-1. The symbols which are used in Table 4-1, and
which are also used later in the text, are to be read as
follows: The first letter stands for starting-position and the
second for the changing possibilities, with I meaning
















v N IS} ESx SS~a7~
Y Condition II is related with condition SS
o Condition IE is related with condition SE
} Condition I5 is related with condition SI
X Condition EI is related with condition ES
Table 4-1. Design of 9 Conditions.
(The first letter of the indices stands for the
starting-posítion and the second for the
possibilities to change the matrix)
It shoul3 be noted that the 9 conditions are not independent.
Dependency relations exist between the conditions II and SS,
between IE and SE, between IS and SI, and between EI and ES.
The hypotheses formulated above on the effects of equality or
inequality between the two persons refer to the "starting-
position" variable. The "changing possibilities" variable was
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added for exploratory purposes.
4.2. Method
4.2.1. Subjects
Participants in this experiment were 100 female students (ages
between 16 and 18 years) of a Domestic Science School in
Diest (Belgium). They participated in the experiment in dyads.
Within the dyads the following conditions were combined: one
subject in condition II and the other subject in condition SS;
one in IE and the other in SE; one in IS and the other in SI;
one in EI and the other in ES. Only the EE subjects were
confronted with a subject in the same condition. In this
latter condition 10 dyads were run. In each of the other 8
conditions 10 subjects were run. Thus, there were five kinds
of sessions in this experiment, and each kind was run 10
times. The subjects were randomly distributed over the
conditions.
4.2.2. Procedure
The two subjects were seated next to one another at the same
side of a table,partitioned so that they could not see each
other nor observe one another's activities. ~ach subject had
a matrix before her which was either identical (qua shape and
entries) with matrix 13~13 (equality starting-position) or
with matrix 15~11 (unequality starting-position). The only
difference from the matrices discussed thus far was that
persons A and B were denoted respectively as persons One and
Two, the alternatives al and a2 respectively as A and B, and
the alternatives bl and b2 respectively as X and Y.
The experiment was conducted by five (male) experimenters each
of whom ran two of the five different kinds of sessions.
The instructions were given on tape. The instructions for the
II and SS conditions, are given below as an illustration.
"I would like to ask you to listen carefully to the
instructions. Would you please from now on stop speaking,
either to yourself or anyone else.
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What you are participating in is an experiment on how
people behave in certain game situations. We will thus ask
you to play a certain game according to some rules which
will be explained to you. A game means among other things,
that you can gain points or a certain prize. As we will
soon explain, you will be able to gain points in this
game.
One of you is player One and the other is player Twq.
Whether you are player One or Two is shown on a slip of
paper before you. The reason why one of you is player Oneand the other player Two is purely incídental, and dependsupon the random seating arrangements.
Each of you has two cards. Player One has cards A and B,
and player Two cards X and Y. In each game trial you willhave to show one of your two cards to the experimenter,
so that the other player cannot see which one. The pointsyou gain depend upon what you both choose ín one trial.
Look at the point card in front of you. This card is
divided into four sguares. In each square the points forplayer One are at the left side of the slant line and
those for player Two at the right side.
Thus, for example, when player One chooses A and player
mwo X, then you are in the upper left sguare of the card,
which means that player One gets 15 points and player Two11 points.
If, for example, player One chooses A and player Two Y,
then you are in the upper right square of the card, whichmeans that player One gets 12 points and player Two 10
points.
If, for example, player One chooses B and player Two X,
then you are in the lower left square of the card, whichmeans that player One gets 14 points and player Two 4points.
If, for example, player One chooses B and player Two Y,then you are in the lower right square of the card, which
means that player One gets 12 points and player Two 9points.
During the whole game the total score of each player wíll
be recorded separately and the experimenter will informboth about the scores after each trial."
Followina upon these instructions, four exercise trials were
run (AX, AY, BX and BY). Then, when normally such an
exoeriment starts, the instructions proceeded:
"As you can see, the points on the card are very important
for the scores you can get. These points, however, werechosen randomly, and you are allowed to chanqe them in the
followina way.
Player One can change one of the numbers which are left of
the slant line in one of the four squares. He can do that,
completely at his own choice, by either adding 1, 2 or 3
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points to that number or by subtracting 1, 2 or 3 points
from the number. He can also leave the numbers unchanged if
he wants. In addition, he can also change one of the
numbers to the right of the slant line in one of the four
squares. Here, too, he can maximally add or subtract three
points from the number, or leave the numbers unchanged.
Player Two can change one number left of the slant line in
one of the four squares by maximally 1 point, or leave the
numbers unchanged. In addition, he can also change one
number at the right-hand side of the slant line :.n one of
the four squares by adding or subtracting 1 point. He may
slso leave the numbers unchanged.
Thus, each of you can change two numbers on the card, one
left of and one right of the slant line. The two numbers
do not have to be in the same square. It is always so,
however, that one of the numbers can influence your own
score and the other number affects the score of the other
player. But as has already been said, you can even leave
one or both numbers unchanged.
The fact that player One can change the numbers by
maximally 3 and player Two by maximally 1, corresponds
with your choice of seats. Had you chosen your seats
differently, you would have had the opposite situation.
Player One can indicate the changes he wants to make by
writing t3, }2, tl, -1, -2, -3 after the number on the
card. You can, if you want, leave the numbers unchanged.
Player Two can indicate the changes he wants to make by
writing tl or -1 after the number he wants to change. He,
too, can leave the numbers unchanged, if he wants.
When you have done that, you give your card to the
experimenter. He will use your changes to make up a new
card, which he will then give back to you. You can then
start again making changes to the card in the same way as
just described. That same procedure will be repeated a
number of times. The final card obtained in that way will
be used to play the actual game, as I explained to you at
the very beginning."
The number of trials during which the subjects could change
the card in the way described above was actually 10. The
subjects were not told this number beforehand.
Depending upon the starting-position, the instructions
referred to the matrix entries on matrix 15~11 (conditions IE
and SE, IS and SI, II and SS) or the entries on matrix 13~13
(conditions EI and ES, or EE and EE) of Figure 4-2. Also
depending upon the changing possibilities, the instruction
spoke of changes by maximally 3(superior changing
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possibilities), by maximally 1(inferior changing
possibilities), or maximally 2(eaual changing possibilities).
After the lOth trial the experiment was explained and the
subjects were sworn to secrecy.
4.3. Results
It was first determined by how much each subject changed his
own and the other person's GM, FC' and RC values per trial.
These change scores were put into an analysis of variance
with "starting-position", "trials", and "self vs other" as
independent variables. In so doing the following restrictions
were taken into account:
a. For the sake of homogeneity of variance, no conditions
with different changing possibilities were put into one
analysis.
b. Because the scores of the conditíons IE and SE are
correlated with one another, but are uncorrelated with the
scores of the EE condition, those three conditions were
compared by means of paired comparisons between
conditions.
c. Each condition has 10 subjects, except condition EE which
has 10 dyads. In this condition, the mean of the two
subjects in a dyad was taken as the score.
This resulted in five clusters of analyses:
1. II with EI and SI
2. IE with EE
3. IE with SE
9. EE with SE
5. IS with ES and SS.
The analyses are fully represented in Appendices 4A to 4E,
inclusive.
Since there are three independent variables per analysis, each
ANOVA produces 7 testable portions of variance. As one can see
in Appendices 4A to 4E inclusive, only one of the 35 portions
of variance in the 5 ANOVAs, using RC as dependent variable,
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is significant at the 58 level. This is less than one can
expect on the basis of chance. The only sigiiificance (p C 0.05)
concerns the starting-position in the IE with EE analysis.
It appears that the person with an inferior starting-position
builds up higher RC values for himself and for his partner
than a person in a condition of equal starting-position.
A similar situation shows up in the analyses with FC' as
dependent variable. Here, too, only one of the 35 testable
portions of variance is significant (p C 0.05). It is the
portion concerning the effect of trials in the IS, ES and SS
analysis. The subjects in those conditions show rather
unsystematic variations over trials in the extent to which
they change their own Fate Control over the other plus
the Fate Control of the other over themselves.
Many more systematic variations are found in the extent to
which subjects change the General Mean (GM) of their own
matrix entries and the matrix entries of their partner. Those
variations for self and other per starting-position and per
trial are shown in Appendices 5A to C inclusive and in Figure














C- Self~Other p~0.001 p~0.001 p~0.05 p~0.01 p~0.001
A x B pC0.05
A x C pf0.01 p~0.01
B x C p~0.05 p~0.05 p~0.01
A x B x C pL0.05 pG0.05
Table 4-2. Overview of significant portions of variances of
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Figure 4-3. Changes in GM of Self (~~) and Other ( o---0 ),
by starting-position, by possibilities to change
and by trial.
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The meaning of the variable "self vs other" is apparent from
the data in the tables, figures and analyses. In all five
analyses, "self vs other" produces a significant main effect:
in each case, a subject gives more to himself than to his
partner. This general pattern, however, can be differentiated
in some important respects. Subjects in the SE and SS
conditions give more to their partner than to themselves in
the first trials. This produces some significant interactions
in the analysis involving IE and SE, namely an interaction
between starting-position and self vs other (p t 0.01),
between starting-position and trials (p G 0.05) and between
starting-position and trials and self vs other (p L0.05). The
same three-way interaction (p t0.05) and an interaction
between starting-position and self vs other (p C:0.01) i
found in the analysis of the conditions with superior changing
possibilities. As appears from ~igure 4-3, the gap between
what subjects with inferior chanaing possibilities ~ive to
themselves and to their partner increases over trials. This
corresponds to a significant interaction (p C 0.05) between
trials and self vs other in the analysis involving conditions
II, EI and SI. A similar significant interaction (p t 0.05) is
found in the analysis involving the conditions EE and SE.
There, too, the discrepancy between what one gives to own and
to the other inc.reases over trials (except in the very last
trial no. 10). In contrast, however, the same significant
interaction (p G0.05) in the analysis involving conditions IE
and EE stems from the fact that the discrepancy between what
one gives to own and to the other is greater in the first
couple of trials than at the end. In the two latter analyses,
the major contribution to interaction effects comes from
respectively SE and IE, but this does not result in
significant second-order interactions.
4.4. Discussion
The ger.eral pattern of results concerning the changes in GM
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Figure 4-4. Difference between GMs of two subjects in a dyad.
comparison theory. The kind of influence the changes have
upon the differences in GM between the two oersons in a dyad,
is shown in Figure 4-4. It is found that the GM differences
of the SS and II conditions and the GM differences of the SE
and IE conditions remain rather stable from the 8th trial on.
The former difference stabilizes at about 3.75 and the latter
at about 3.0 units. The Gt9 difference of the ES and EI
conditions stabilizes at about 1.0 from the 3rd trial on.
This means that the SS and SE subjects concede part of their
GM advantage. They do this by in fact giving somewhat more to
the other than to themselves in the first trials. In the
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subsequent trials they take less away from their partner than
their partner gives to himself, and they give less to them-
selves than their partner takes away from them. Then at a
certain point of difference (smaller than at the beginning),
a balance between give and take appears. A subject in the EI
condition continuously gives to himself and takes away from
his partner. That subject's partner, however, who has
superior changing possibilities, causes a slight difference
in the first trials by giving to himself and taking away from
the other, but when he has attained a lead of about 1.0 GM
difference, the lead is further maintained at that level. An
IS subject uses all means (give to himself and take away from
the other) to improve his inferior position, but his SI
partner defends himself against these efforts with the same
sort but less forceful means. Taken together, the SI subjects
do not manage to transform their position backlog into a
lead. Between the 9th and lOth trial, the GM difference does
not change any more. It is not clear whether this means that
the difference really stabilizes at that level, or that the
number of trials is too small to observe a further change.
t9e should have had more trials in that con3ition in order to
be able to decide on that.
The EE subjects continuously give to themselves and take away
from their partner. However, because they give more to them-
selves than they take away from the other, their own GM
increases, namely from 10.25 to 11.52. The GMs of the EI and
ES subjects increase to 11.70 and 12.50. In the conditions
of an inferior starting-position, which means a GM of 7.25 to
start with, the GM increases to 10.20, 10.20 and 10.85 for
subjects whose changing possibilities are respectively
inferior, equal or superior. In the superior starting-position
conditions, which means a GM of 13.25 to start with, only the
GM of subjects with superior changing possibilities increases,
namely to 13.95. The GM of subjects with equal changing
possibilities remains essentially unchanged (13.20), whereas
for subjects with inferior changing possibilities it drops
77
to 11.55.
We can thus conclude that the subjects actually regulate
their give-and-take behavior so that the resulting chances in
GM are quite predictable from social comparison theory.
That conclusion does not apply to changes in Reflexive
Control (RC) and Fate Control (FC). There are hardly any
systematic differences between conditíons for those two
components of the matrix. This implies, of course, that
there are also no systematic changes between conditions
in the qualitative differences of the matrix, which are
rElated to those components.
In other words, the subjects have effectuated a comparison
on the immediately evident aspects of the matrix (GM) and not
on the functional aspects, resulting from their changes. :~hat
Kelley and Thibaut (1978) note in the first page of their
book, may thus actually have been due to: "The nature of the
interdependent relationship is not always fully understood
by the participants". It might have been different if the
subjects had not only had a chance to change the matrix, but
had also had a chance to interact actually with their
partner, or play actually the game. It is indeed impossible
to compare on dimensions into which one has no insight.
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CHAPTER 5
THE EFFECTS OF CHOICES AND OUTCOMES UPON BEHAVIOR IN A
PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME
5.1. Introduction
It has been shown in several studies that social comparison
plays an important role in the behavior in mixed-motive games
(MCClintock and McNeel, 1966a, b; McClintock and Nuttin,
1969; Carment, 1974; Toda, Shinotsuka, McClintock and Stech,
1978). In all these studies, done in different countries and
with subjects of different ages, it was consistently found
that subjects make more competitive choices in a MDG when
they get feedback about their own and the other person's
cumulative score than when they only get feedback about their
own cumulative score. Messick and McClintock (1968) found the
same in some types of decomposed games. Gallo, Irwin and
Avery (1966), using a MDG, and Tedeschi, Lesnick and Gahagan
(1968), using a PDG, manipulated four different feedback
conditions in their experiment: no feedback about cumulative
score; only feedback about one's own cumulative score; only
feedback about the other's cumulative score, feedback about
both one's own and the other's cumulative score. Their
findings indicate that feedback about the other's cumulative
score leads to more competitive choices (D-choices) than
feedback about one's own cumulative score.
All the experiments cited were done with symmetrical matríces.
Their results can be understood in terms of social comparison
theory. When subjects are informed about the other's (and
their own) cumulative score, the tendency to avoid a backlog
and to achieve a(moderáte) lead is reinforced. Therefore,
feedback about the other's and about one's own cumulative
score, leads to more competitive choices than feedback only
about one's own cumulative score.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the effects of
comparison between one's own and the ohter person's
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(cumulative) scores were investigated too by t4essick and
Thorngate (1967), Marwell, Ratcliff and Schmitt (1969) and
Rijsman and Poppe (1977). It was found in all these studies
that outcomes were an effective and important determinant of
choices made by the subjects.
Besides the outcomes, obtained in a previous trial, there are
still other factors which can determine a subject's next
choice. One of them can, for example, be that a subject,
after observing the other one's choices, attributes certain
intentions to the other (see for example Kelley and Stahelski,
1970a) and reacts to those attributed intentions. Another
example of the fact that choices should not be only determined
by outcomes in the previous trial is strategic choice
behavior.
In the PDG and MDG used, it is impossible to disentangle the
effects of outcomes in the last trial from effects of choice
er se in the last trial. It has always been the case that a
specific choice coincidence fully determined what one's own
and the other person's outcomes would be. This is due to the
fact that only "utilities" are íncluded in the matrix.
However, one can also consider the entries in the matrix, not
as deterministic values but as expected utilities, i.e. as
outcomes which can be obtained with a certain probability.
Let this be illustrated by means of the matrices in Figure
5-1.
A PDG matrix as matrix (1) is generally conceived as matrix
(2) in this figure: the choice coincidences always lead to
some outcomes. The probability in all the cells of the matrix
is the same, namely 100~. Only the outcomes vary over the
cells. However, it is also possible to keep the outcomes
constant over the cells, and to vary the probabilities with
which those outcomes can be obtained over the cells. That is
done in matrix (3) of Figure S-1. The expected utilities of






















































Figure 5-1. Deterministic (2) and Probabilistic (3) version
of PDG matrix.
It is open to doubt, however, whether the two matrices are
psychologically equivalent to each other.
We introduce the probabilistic interpretation of the PDG
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matrix because this approach allows the effects of choices per
se and the effects of outcomes to be disentangled to a certain
extent. Indeed, if both subjects choose C a great number of
times, each of them would get 100 units after 658 of the
choices and nothing in 35g of the choices, but it is not the
case that getting either outcome necessarily coincides for the
two subjects. Statistically, getting 100 units will coincide
for the two subjects in 95.25~ of cases, and getting nothing
at all in 12.25~ of the cases. In 22.758 of the cases, one
subject will get 100 units while the other one gets nothing
and similarly, in 22.758 of the cases one will get nothing
while the other subject gets 100.
In order to measure the relation between choice or outcomes on
the one hand and behavior on the other, some indices devised
by Rapoport and Chammah (1965) can be borrowed. They describe
a number of "state conditioned propensities". A state-
conditioned propensity is a person's probability of choosing
cooperatively (C) after a specific choice coincidence at the
previous trial. For example, P(C~CD) is the person's
probability of choosing C after a trial in which he himself
chose C and the other D. Usually, that ís in a deterministic
PDG, the so-called "state" is formed by both choices and
outcomes. In a probabilistic PDG, however, the symbol P(C~CD)
only refers to choices. We will therefore call these
conditioned propensities "choice-conditioned propensities".
Analogous to the "choice-conditioned propensities" one can
define an "outcome-conditioned propensity": a person's
probability of choosina C after a specific outcome coincidence
on the previous trial. For example, P(C~t-) refers to a
person's probability of choosing C after a trial in which he
himself was rewarded, but the other person was not. It is also
possible to determine a person's probability of choosing C
after specific coincidence of choices and outcomes in the
previous trial. For example, P(C~C}D-) refers to a person's
probability of choosing C after the trial in which he himself
chose C, and was rewarded for it, and the other person chose
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D without being rewarded for it.
Altogether there are 4 choice-conditioned, 4 outcome-
conditioned and 16 choice-outcome-conditioned propensities. In
the first two types of conditioned propensities, the effects
of choices and outcomes are only partially separated, and not
yet fully. The latter is only achieved in the choice-outcome-
conditioned propensities. Thus, only by using this most
refined type of conditioned propensity will we be able to
weight the relative importance of choices and outcomes. If
social comparison takes place, then choice behavior should be
contingent on outcomes. Comparison, indeed, only takes place
in a quantitative or quantifiable dimension (eventually of an
ordinal kind). In the present experiment we will investigate
whether behavior is more contingent on outcomes than on
choices. For that purpose we will use a matrix, that is
matrix (3) ín Figure 5-1. In addition we will also run a
condition with matrix (2) of Figure 5-1.
When "contingency on outcomes" is mentioned, it should be
borne in mind that this must be contingency on the outcomes of
the subject himself and at the same time on those of the other
person. If it is found that the choices are only contingent on
the outcomes of the subject himself, then it could mean that
the "win-stay, lose-change " principle is playing a role.
In the classical deterministic version of the PDG, a subject
who gets feedback about his own and the other's outcomes, can
determine with full certainty what the other one has chosen in
that trial. In the probabilistic version, on the other hand,
it is possible to give outcome feedback without allowing the
subject to determine with full certainty what the other person
has chosen. (The subject may determine, however, on a basis of
both his own choice and the outcomes, what the most probable
choice of the other person was). One may assume that the
contingency on outcomes will be stronger when one does not
know what the other person's choice was, then if the other
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person's choice is known. To follow this up, we shall create a
condition making use of the probabilistic version of the
matrix in which the subjects get no feedback on the choices
made.
In the experiment three conditions are broached:
I: the deterministic version of the PDG
II: the probabilistic version of the PDG with feedback on the
choices made
III: the probabilistic version of the PDG without feedback on
the choices made.
In all three conditions there is continuous feedback regarding
scores and totals of both persons.
It is difficult to predict the conditions in which there will
be more C-choices made. On the one hand the probabilistic
character of the matrix in conditions II and III causes more
uncertainty than the deterministic character of the matrix in
condition I. This could cause fewer cooperative (C) choices in
conditions II and III than in condition I.
On the other hand, owing to the probabilistic character of the
matrix in conditions II and III, one of the subjects in the
dyad could gain a certain lead by chance. When this lead is
big enough, it could lead to more C-choices in these
conditions in comparison with condition I.
5.2. Method
5.2.1. Subiects
56 male, first-year psychology students of the Katholieke
Hogeschool at Tilburg took part in the experiment. They had
all volunteered as subjects for an experiment on "choice-
behavior". Twenty-eight pairs of subjects were formed at
random. The participants in each pair came from different
study groups, so that they did not know each other very well.
In one pair, one of the participants knew about the
Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Consequently, the results of this
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pair were not included for analysis.
5.2.2. Procedure
In each session 2 subjects were placed separately in sound-
proof cabins. Each cabin contained a headphone, a card with
matrix (1) from Figure 5-1, and a box with 2 buttons (C and
D)1). Through a window in the cabin the subjects could see a
video monitor.
After the subjects had seated themselves in the cabins they
heard the following lnstructions through the headphone:
"Please, listen attentively to the instructions.
You are taking part in an investigation into choice and
decision behavior. You are asked in this experiment to
make a number of choices.
As you know, you are taking part in this experiment twoat a time. One is sitting in cabin 1 and the other in
cabin 2. Thus we shall address you both, as person 1 and
person 2, respectively. For complete certainty you see
before you a card indicating whether you are person 1or. 2.
It is the intention that in a few moments, person 1 and
person 2 will simultaneously make a number of choices
between alternatives C and D. The small box with two
buttons and two small lamps in front of you serves to
indicate your choice. As you see, the left-hand button
and left-hand lamp are indicated by the letter C and theright-hand button and lamp by the letter D.
With every choice you can get a number of points which
represent a certain amount of money. For every 100 pointsthat you get you will be paid 4(Dutch) cents at the end
of the experiment. The number of poin.ts that you get isdepend.ent upon what you yourself have chosen and on what
the other person has chosen. The point card that you seeon the table in front of you will serve to make this
clear. This card contains 4 compartments. In each
compartment you see the scores of person 1 in the bottom
left-hand corner under this slant line, and in the top
right-hand corner above the slant line the scores of
person 2."
1) Footnote: mhese buttons were indicated as "A" and "B".
"A" and "B" were also spoken of in the instructions. In
this report "A" and "B" are replaced by "C" and "D",
respectively in order to fit them better to the names used
in the literature, "Cooperation" and "Defection".
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After this, the instructions varied per condition. In
condition I the instructions proceeded as follows:
"On the card on the table before you, you can see
how many ?oints you can get. The number of points you
can get in a trial depends upon the choices that you both
make simultaneously. On the card you see four
compartmer.ts. In each compartment the points for person 1
are on the left-hand side under the slant line and those
of person 2 on the right-hand side above the slant line.
Thus, for example, if person 1 chooses C and person 2
also chooses C, then one finds oneself in the upper left-
hand corner of the card, that means that person 1 gets
65 points and person 2 likewise gets 65 points. If person
1 chooses C, for example, and person 2 chooses D, then
one finds oneself in the bottom right-hand corner of the
card which means thus, that both person 1 and person 2
each get 35 points. What each of the two have chosen and
the number of points each participant got, will be
reported after every trial by the experimenter via
the television screen that you see outside in front of
the cabin window. Likewise the total score for each
participant will be reported. Let us demonstrate this by
means of four exercise trials."
After this four exercise trials were held (CC, CD, DC and DD).
After these were finished the first trial started. The be-
ainnina of each trial was indicated by a peep-sound.
The instructions in conditions II and III were identical with
one another except for a few communications which were not
mentioned in condition III. These communications will
hereinafter be placed in brackets []. After the general
introduction, the instructions in conditions II and III
proceeded as follows:
"In each trial you have a chance of getting 100 points.
On the card on the table in front of you, you can see
how great the chance is of getting 100 points. How much
chance you have of getting 100 points in the trial
depends upon what you both simultaneously choose. On the
card you see 4 compartments. The chances of person 1 are
in the lef~-hand bottom corner under the slant line, and
those of person 2 are in the upper right-hand corner
above the slant line. Thus, for example, if person 1
chooses C and person 2 also chooses C, then both will
find themselves in the upper left-hand corner of the
card, which means that person 1 has a 65g chance to get
100 points and likewise, that person 2 also has a 65~
chance to get 100 points.
If, for example, person 1 chooses C and person 2 chooses
D, then both find themselves in the upper right-hand
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corner of the card, which means that person 1 has a 258
chance of getting 100 points and person 2 a 758 chance
of getting 100 points. If, for example, person 1 chooses
D and person 2 chooses C, then both find themselves in
the bottom left-hand corner, that means that person 1 has
a 758 chance and person 2 a 258 chance of getting 100
points. If person 1 chooses D and person 2 also chooses
D, then both find themselves in the bottom right-hand
corner of the card, meaning that person 1 then has a 35~
chance of getting 100 points and likewise, that person 2
has a 358 chance of getting 100 points.
Whether or not, one can get 100 points on the basis of
the chance percentage, is specified with the help of the
chance tables with random numbers that are on the table
in front of the experimenter. The chance table is used in
every trial for each of the persons. The chances that
each person has, are thus dependent of each other in the
sense that if, for example, both have the same percentage
of chance to get 100 points, sometimes one will get the
100 points and the other not, while in another trial the
opposite can occur. If one has a certain percentage of
chance to get 100 points, that does not in fact mean that
one will get the 100 points. However, it is true that the
greater the percentage of chance, the greater the chance
is that you will get the 100 points.
After every trial the experimenter will indicate upon the
monitor screen that you see in front of the window of the
cabin [ what each of you has chosen and ] whether one or
both have obtained 100 points. Likewise the total scores
of each will be reported. Let us demonstrate this by
means of four exercise trials.
Would persons 1 and 2 please choose C. Press the left-
hand button. [ The experimenter now notes on the screen
that persons 1 ar.d 2 have chosen C.] According to the
chance tables in this trial each of the two should get
100 points. This is also noted upon the screen. The total
is thus 100 noints for each.
Would person 1 now choose C and person 2 choose D. Then
press the button .. .[Now C is noted under "person 1"
and D under "person~2".] According to the chance tables,
person 1 should get 100 points and person 2 should get
nothing. The totals become 200 and 100 respectively just
as you see on the screen.
Wouid person 1 now choose D and person 2 C. According to
the chance tables person 1 should get 0 point and person
2 should get 0 point. The information on the screen is,
from left to right: [D, C] 0, 0 and total scores 200 and
100.
Would person 1 now choose D and person 2 also D?
According to the chance tables 1 should get 0 point while
2 should get 100 points. The information on the screen is
now: [D, D] 0, 100, 200, 200.
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These were the 4 exercise trials. We now begin the actual
experiment. During the actual experiment the beginning ofevery trial will be signalled by a peep-tone.
The intention is that immediately after every peep-toneyou make a choice based upon the rules that have been
explained. Take off the headphones and place them on the
table in front of you. We shall not need the headphonesany further in this experiment. The peep-tones come from
one of the small boxes."
After 250 trials the experiment was explained to the subjects
and the subjects were sworn to secrecy.
5.3. Results
5.3.1. Percentage-CooPerative Choices
The percentages of cooperative choices in conditions I, II
and III were respectively 63.98, 39.08 and 24.18. The 250
trials per condition were divided into trial blocks of 25
choices. The percentages of C-choices per trial block and
condition are shown in Figure 5-2. The ANOVA reveals a
significant main effect of conditions (p G 0.01) and a
significant interaction between conditions and trial blocks
(p G0.01). The three conditions differ significantly from one
another (p C 0.05; I and III: p C 0.01; Newman-Keuls method).
The significant interaction is caused by different trends of
C-choice percentages over trials in the various conditions.
In condition I the percentage of C-choices starts at 378 at
trial block 1 and it rises gradually to 698 at trial block 4,
after which it remains more or less stable. In condition II
the percentage of C-choices starts at 468 at trial block 1,
decreases to 30~ at trial block 4, to rise again to 49~ at
trial block 10. In condition III the percentage of C-choices
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Figure 5-2. Proportion of cooperative choices by 25-trial
blocks for deterministic PDG (~--~),
probabilistic PDG with (r --~) and without
(v--o) feedback on choice of other person in
previous trial.
5.3.2. Choice-conditioned-propensities
As already explained, condition II allows us to discriminate
between choice-conditioned propensities on the one hand and
outcome-conditioned propensities on the other. We start with
an analysis of the choice-conditioned propensities of
condition II, together with the state-conditioned
propensities of condition I.
The mean of the 4 state-conditioned propensities of condition
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I is 0.49 and that of the 9 choica-conditioned propensities
of condition II is 0.40. As one can seen in ANOVA table 5-2,
the difference between these two means is almost significant
(p ~0.07). That means that the tendency to choose C, in-
degendentl;~ of one's own and the other person's choice at the
previous trial, is slightly stronger in condition I than in
condition II. Since there are no further interactions between
conditions and propensities, the conditions will be treated
together in the remainder of this paragraph.
As one can see in Table 5-1, P(C~CC) is higher than, and
P(C~DD) lower than P(C~CD) or P(C~DC), the latter two being
almost equal to one another. This leads to a significant maín
effect of one's own previous C or D-choice (p G 0.001) and a
significant main effect of the other's previous C or D-choice
(p C0.001) upon the next choice. In both cases, the
probability of a C-choice after C is 0.55 and the probability
of a C-choice after D is 0.34. The interaction between the
two variables is also significant (p G 0.05).
5.3.3. Outcome-conditioned-propensities
Besides the choice-conditioned propensities in condition II,
one can also calculate the outcome-conditioned propensities.
The latter can also be done in condition III. The mean out-
come-conditioned propensity of the PDG with choice feedback
(condition II) turns out to be 0.39. When the subjects are
not informed about the choice of the other person (condition
III), the mean propensity is 0.24. The difference between
these two means is significant (F - 6.03, df 1~34, p C 0.05).
There are no significant interactions between conditions and
propensities, and therefore conditions will be treated
together in the remainder of this paragraph.
It is striking that getting 100 points or not in a trial has
hardly any effect upon one's tendency to choose C at the next
trial. The probability of choosing C after having received
100 points in the previous trial is 0.32.
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Table 5-1. Means of state-conditioned propensities of























The entries with a different superscript are different from
one another (p G 0.05). (Newman-Keuls method)
Table 5-2. Analysis of variance of state-conditioned





Error between subjects 34 0.095
B- subject chose C vs D 1 1.673 52.46~~~
AB 1 0.003 G1
Error B 34 0.032
C- Other chose C vs D 1 1.667 29.22~~~
AC 1 0.144 2.53
Error C 34 0.057
BC 1 0.149 4.46x~
ABC 1 0.003 G1
Error BC 34 0.033
Total 143
~ pC0.07 x~ pG0.05 zxt pG0.001
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The Drobability of choosing C after not ~having received 100
points in the last trial is 0.31. Of greater importance is
the fact whether or not the other has received 100 points in
the last trial. If he did, the subject's probability of
choosing C in the next trial is 0.36. If he did not, this
probability is 0.27. This difference is significant
(F - 39.93, df 1~34, p L 0.001). There is no significant
interaction effect of receiving 100 points or not by self and
other.
5.3.4. Choice-outcome-conditioned ro ensities---------------------------P--P--------
In condition II the subjects were told what they themselves
and what the other has chosen at the last trial. Owing to the
probabilistic character of condition II the information
reaarding choices is not completely confounded with the
information on scores. Therefore, it is possible in this
condition to compare the influence of the choices (made by
the subjects and the other) at trial n-1 on the chance of a
C-choice made by the subject at trial n with the influence of
having received 100 points or not by the subject and~or Other
at trial n-1 on a C-choice made by the subject at trial n.
For this purpose the choice-outcome-conditioned propensities
are calculated: the chance of a C-choice at trial n after a C
or D-choice made by the subject, for which 100 points have
or not have been received and a C or D-choice made by the
ot~er, for which he has or has not received 100 points. In
all there are 2 x 2 x 2 x 2- 16 choice-outcome-conditioned
propensities that can be distinguished. The average values of
these 16 propensities is given in Table 5-3. Table 5-4
ccntains the azalysis of variance.
As described above (results of the state-conditioned
propensities of condition I and the choice-conditioned
propensities of condition II) the choice of the subject is to
a high degree contingent on his previous choice and the
previous choice of the other.
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Other Other Other Other
not not
rewarded rewarded rewarded rewarded
Other
Subject ~
~~ C 0.62 0.57 0.61 0.73 0.63
chose
C ~~ ~
~~ p 0.41 0.62 0.35 0.51 0.47
Other ~
Subject ~~ C 0.40 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.32
chose
D ~~
~~ p 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.22
Mean 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.44 0.41
~ For t.~ subjects in this condition the actual propensity could
not be calculated. ?hese missing data points were (arbitrarity)
taken as 0.50.
If the subject himself chose C at the prevíous trial, then
the orobability of his choosing C is 0.55. This is
significantly (p G 0.001) higher than in the case that he
chose D at the previous trial (0.27).
93
Table 5-4. Analysis of variance of choice-outcome-conditioned
propensities of condition II.
df MS F-ratio
Between subjects 17 0.201
A(S~abject C vs D at previous trial) 1 5.636 98.71~~
B(Other C vs D at previous trial ) 1 1. 2 4 5 21. 80~~
C(Subject (not) rewarded at previous trial) 1 0.013 G1
D(Othes (not) rewarded at previous trial) 1 0.100 1.75
AB 1 0.071 1.24
AC 1 0.002 L1
~ 1 0.352 6.16~
BC 1 0.022 G1
BD 1 0.186 3.26
CB 1 0.045 G1
ABC 1 0.257 4.50~
ABD 1 0.041 ~1
ACD 1 0.003 Q1
BCD 1 0.083 1.45
ABCD 1 0.027 ~1
Pooled interaction with subjects 225 0.057
Total 287
t pC0.05 ~~ pt0.01
When the other chose C at the previous trial, then the
probability of the subject choosing C is 0.48. This is
significantly (p c0.001) higher then when the other chose D
at the previous trial (0.35).These probabilities are
independent of the rewards that the subject and other person
got at the previous trial.
One can also examine what the effect is of the subject and the
other having or not having received a reward of 100 points at
the previous trial, independent of a C or D-choice by the
subject and the other at the trial. It apoears then that the
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above-ascertained (in the results of the outcome-conditioned
propensities) influence of having or not having received 100
points by the other has ceased to be a significant main
effect in the analysis. Also, having or not having received
100 points by the subject himself, independently of the
choices made, appears to have no effect upon the probability
with which a C or D-choice is made. However, a few inter-
action effects of choices made and rewards received were
found.
There is a significant interaction effect of the choice
which the subject made at the previous trial and the reward
obtained by the other at the same trial (p G 0.05). If the
subject chose D at the previous trial, then it does not
matter whether the other did or did not get 100 points. In
the first case the probability that the subject continues
the series of choices with a C is 0.29 and in the second
instance it is 0.26. If the subject chose C at the previous
trial, then there is a greater chance that the subject will
repeat this C-choice if the other received no reward (0.61)
than if the other 3id receive a reward (0.55).
Apart from this first-order interaction, there is a
significant (p G 0.05) second-order interaction between the
previous choice by the subject, the previous choice of the
other and having or not having received a reward by the
subject at the previous trial. According to this interaction,
after a C-choice made by both the subject and the other the
chance of a C-choice by the subject is greater if he has not
been rewarded at the previous trial than if he has (0.67 and
0.60 resp.). The chance that the subject chooses C is greater
after having received a reward than after having received no
reward at the previous trial, if one of the parties involved
chose C and the other D(0.51 and 0.43 resp. after a CD-
combination and 0.35 and 0.29 resp. after a DC-combination).
When both chose D at the previous trial, it does not matter
whether the subject has been rewarded or not. The
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probability of a C-choice by the subject is than 0.21 and
0.23, respectively.
5.3.5. Own-choice[both-outcomes-conditiQnQ~oro~ensities--- ------ ---- -------- -
Since a subject in condition III is not informed about the
other person's choice, it does not make sense to calculate
the choice-outcome-conditioned propensities in this condition
in the same way as in condition II. It is sensible and
possible, however, to make a more differentiated analysis of
the outcome-conditioned propensity in condition III than has
been done up to now. Indeed, each probability of a C-choice
after reward or no reward for both persons at the previous
trial can be divided into two cases, one in which the subject
chose C and one in which he chose D. Those 8 propensities,
to which we will refer as the "own choice~both outcomes-
conditioned propensities" are shown in Table 5-5. The left-
hand part of Table 5-6 shows the results of the ANOVA on the
data. It is found that subjects are much more prone (p c 0.001)
to choose C when they have chosen C at the previous trial
then when they have chosen D at the previous trial
(respectively 0.57 and 0.15). The outcomes are important
here in the following sense. The probability that a subject
repeats a C is relatively small when he himself was not rewarded
and the other person was. The probability on the contrary,
to choose C after having chosen D, is relatively high for
that same combination of outcomes. This produces several
significant interaction effects in the ANOVA.
Instead of asking "What is the probability of C after a
certain event at the previous trial?" one may also ask "What
is the probability that one will repeat his previous choice
after a certain event at that previous trial?". To answer
that question, we should subtract from 1.00 these entries in
Table 5-5 which refer to the C-choice probabilities after a
D-choice. The entries in Table 5-5, which are put between
brackets, refer to the probability of repeating the previous
choice.
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Table 5-5. Own choice~both outcomes-conditioned propensities
(condition III).
Self Self Self not Self not
rewarded rewarded rewarded rewarded
Othar Other not Other Other not
rewarded re~aarded rewarded rewarded
after
C ~0.66a 0.62a 0.36b ~0.64a 0.57
choice (0.66) (0.62) (0.36) (0.64) (0.57)
after
D 0.13X O.llX 0.22y 0.13y 0.15
choice (0.87) (0.89) (0.78) (0.87) (0.85)
0.39 0.37 0.29 0.38 0.36
(0.76) (0.76) (0.57) (0.76) (0.71)
~ For one subject in this oorxiition, the actual Propensity could not be
calculated. This missing data point was (arbitrarily) taken as 0.50.
~ The entries with a different superscript in each row are different
from one another (p ~ 0.05).(Newman-Keuls method).
N - 18
BetwePn brackets: probability of saQne choice as at previous trial.
The ANOVA on these data is shown in the right-hand part of
Table 5-6. It turns out that the subjects are more prone to
repeat a D-choice (0.85) than a C-choice (0.57) (F - 26.70,
df 1~17, p G 0.001). The other sources of variance can, under
a different label, also be seen in the left-hand part of
Table 5-6. Four of the present effects are now significant
because a subject isless inclined to repeat his previous
choice when the other person was rewarded and he himself not.
This is the more so after a C-choice (0.36 versus 0.64) than
a D-choice (0.78 versus 0.88).
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Table 5-6. Analysis of variance of own choice~both outcome-
conditioned oropensities (left side) and
probability of making same choice as at previous
trial (right side), condition III.
df MS F-ratio
Error between subjects 17 0.108
A- after C vs D choice 1 6.430 74.73~
Error A 17 0.086
B- Subject (not) rewarded 1 0.065 1.10
Error B 17 0.059
C- Other (not) re~arded 1 0.039 1.35
Error C 17 0.029
AB 1 0.355 6.12~
Error AB 17 0.058
PC 1 0.292 15.80~
Error PC 17 0.018
HC 1 0.129 6.04~
Error BC 17 0.020
ABC 1 0.345
Error ABC 17 0.026
Zbtal 143




















The most direct answer to the question whether the behavior
is more contingent on the choices at the last trial than on
the outcomes at this trial is given by the choice-outcome-
conditioned propensities. The 15 sources of variance in
Table 5-4 together account for 30.78 of the total variance
(Winer, 1971, pp. 428-430). The significant sources A(own
choice at the previous trial), B(other person's choice at
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the previous trial), and the not significant interaction
between these two main variables account for 28.68. The
sources of variance regarding one's own and~or the other
person's outcomes at the last trial contribute almost nothing
to the variance. Hence, it is shown that choice behavior in a
PDG (at least in the probabilistic version) is not (solely)
determined by outcomes, but (also) to a large extent by
choice. It is recommendable, however, to examine the extent
to which this conclusion is affected by: a) the use of a PDG
instead of a MDG, b) the use of a symmetrical instead of a
asymmetrical matrix.
A striking point in the analysis of the state-conditioned
propensities of condition I and of the choice-conditioned
propensities of condition II is the fact that the
deterministic or probabilistic nature of the matrix has only
a maín effect on the propensities and no interaction effect
with choices made by Subject and Other. For a given
combination of own and other person's choice at the last
trial, the probability of C-choice in the next trial is 98
lower in the probabilistic than in the deterministic version
of the matrix. This may be due to the fact that a
probabilistic matrix (condition II) causes more uncertainty
than a deterministic matrix (condition I).
Just as there is found to be a difference in the level of the
choice-conditioned propensities between conditions I and II,
there is also a difference in the level of the outcome-
conditioned propensities of conditions II and III. In
condition III the propensities are 0.15 lower than in
condition II. Here, too, one could be prone to attribute this
to uncertainty.
The same applies to the percentages of C-choices. In
conditions I, II and III which in this sequence show an
increase in the degree of uncertainty, a decrease in the
percentage of C-choices is seen in the same seauence. Also the
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course of the percentage of C-choices over the trial blocks
is meaningful here. In condition III one sees an almost
continuous decrease over the trial blocks, while in condition
II that is the case up to about 100 trials. After that, an
increase occurs in condition II. In condition I the
percentage of C-choices appears to gradually increase to
about 698. Here, however, the size of the trial blocks (25
trials) has an obscuring effect. When a division into trial
blocks of 5 trials is made, the percentages for the first ten
blocks are as follows: 53, 31, 32, 31, 38, 34, 50, 67, 58 and
71g. These percentages differ from one another (F - 3.66,
df 9~72, p c 0.01). After the first pair of trials there comes
a decrease with a recovery after about 30 trials. In all
three con3itions a lowest point appears in the C-choice
percentages. In condition I this occurs after about 15
trials, in condition II at about the 100th trial. In
condition III the last trial block forms the lowest
percentage of C-choices. The greater the degree of un-
certainty, the later a recovery in number of C-choices will
appear. In condition III this recovery does not even appear.
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CHAPTF.R 6
SOCIAL COMPARISON IN TWO-PERSON EXPERIMENTAL GAMES: A DISCUSSION
In this chapter we shall be taking a closer look at some
aspects of the results of the experiments in chapters 3, 4 and
5. In the course of this study we shall also discuss a few
general points relating to social comparison and experimental
games.
In Chapter 3 we saw that subjects, when comparing the goals
they attribute to Choosers who have chosen certain alternatives
in a 9-choice decomposed game, place the greatest emphasis on
the competition-martyrdom dimension. This means that, as they
compare the Choosers' goals, they are chiefly influenced by the
ratio of the size of the outcomes that Chooser obtains to the
size of the outcomes for Other. This result is particularly
striking in view of the fact that chance is of considerable
importance in the hypothetical situation presented to the
subjects. Firstly, the Choosers were each fortunate enough to
be one of the prizewinners in their own particular state and,
furthermore, the toss of a coin established that they and not
the other prizewinner could choose one of the alternatives.
This means that the Choosers could only consider the outcomes
they obtained as "cues for their own person" to a limited
extent. Nevertheless, social comparison still appears to exert
considerable influence in this situation. In the structure that
can be drawn up on the basis of the similarity ratings of
the Choosers' qoals, the major dimension is the co~petition
dinension, and not the diMensions of individualism, cooperation
or altruism.
This appears to be the case, regardless of the subject's own
particular motivation. In most experiments on cognitions
related to behavior in experimental games, the subject's
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own motivation did appear to have some effect.
Kelley and Stahelski (1970a, b) investigated the so-called
"triangle hypothesis". This hypothesis predicts that
cooperative subjects engaged in PDG interactions with
competitive subjects will make D-choices for defensive
reasons and will thus adapt their behavior to that of the
competitive antagonist. As a result of this adaption the
competitive subject will tend to attribute a competitive
goal to the cooperative subject. This means that a
competitive person will make little distinction between the
goals of competitive and cooperati~~e people: he will
attribute a competitive goal to both categories. A
cooperative person, however, will differentiate between the
goals of persons who are cooperatively or competitively
inclined. At the start of the study the rules of the PDG
were explained to the subjects. After this the subjects
were asked to state which goal they would work towards
during the game. The goals stated were examined to see
whether they were predominantly cooperative or competitive.
Each subject was then paired with another subject who was
predominantly cooperatively or predominantly competitively
oriented. The subjects made 30 choices in the PDG. After
every ten choices they answered a number of questions
concerning their perception of the other player's goal. It
appears, from the results, that predominantly cooperatis~ely
inclined subjects perceive the goals of the other player
rather accurately. This is not true of predominantly
competitively inclined subjects. They attribute a pre-
dominantly competitive goal to both competitively and
cooperatively inclined partners in the PDG.
If these findings should also apply to the real-life
situation, outside the PDG, this would mean that people
with a competitive orientation would perceive people in
qeneral as competitive, while cooperatively oriented
individuals will be aware of a greater degree of hetero-
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geneity in people's goals. On the basis of such general
experiences, the subjects will not only perceive Other's
goals in the manner just described, after a few PDG choices
k~ut will also have ideas about the goals and expectations
about the choices of others, even before the first choice
has been made. A study by Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) showed
that this was, indeed, the case, as regards the PDG. On the
basis of choices made in several decomposed games (cf.
chapter 3 of the present dissertation) they classified a
number of undergraduates as being predominantly cooperatively,
competitively or individualistically oriented. After this the
subjects were asked to estimate what percentage of the under-
graduates would choose each of the three alternatives in 4
decomposed games (one game from each of 4 types of game).
The rules of a classic PDG were then explained to the
subjects. Before making their choices in the PDG they
estimated the percentages of undergraduates that would choose
each of the two alternatives in the game. The estimates the
subjects made for the choices in the classic PDG showed the
same pattern as the results obtained by Kelley and Stahelski.
The competitively oriented subjects expected the under-
graduates to choose the competitive (and individualistic)
alternative in 71~ and the cooperative alternative in 29~ of
the cases. The cooperatively oriented subjects expected 478
of the undergraduates' choices to be competitive and 53g
cooperative. The estimates of those classified as
individualistic fall between those of the competitive and
cooperative subjects: 61~ competitive and 398 cooperative.
Kuhlman and Wimberley found approximately the same pattern in
the results of estimates of choices in a decomposed game of
the PDG-type. In other types of decomposed game, however, it
appeared that the estimates reflected the subjects' own
motivation. In the decomposed game in which the cooperative,
individualistic and competitive motives lead to the choices
of alternatives A, B and C, respectively (known as the triple
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dominance game) cooperatively oriented subjects expected more
A-choices, individualistic oriented more B-choices and
competitively oriented more C-choices from the undergraduates.
Miller and Holmes (1975) also demonstrated that the kind of
matrix employed determines whether the self-fulfilling
prophesy, as formulated by the triangle hypothesis, will be
borne out. They found confirmation for the triangle
hypothesis in their replication of the Kelley and Stahelski
study (1970a). They ha3, however, an extra condition in
their study, in which the PDG matrix employed was extended to
a third alternative, that enabled the subject to make a
defensive choice without having to choose the competitive D-
alternative of the PDG. In this latter condition the triangle
hypothesis was apparently not borne out. Both the cooperative
and the competitive subjects expected, in this condition,
that the "typical person" would make the same choice as them-
selves in about 66g of cases.
This phenomenon, of subjects taking their own behavior as a
guide to predict "what everyone does" is known as "false
consensus" (Ross,Greene and House, 1977). This false
consensus phenomenon in experimental games was also
demonstrated by Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1977), using a
Commons Dilemma Game and by Messé and Sivacek (1979) who used
a PDG.
Since the subjects in the situation presented to them in the
study in Chapter 3 did not have to predict "what everyone
does" but, rather, the degree of similarity between the goals
of a number of Choosers, each of whom had selected one of a
number of clearly defined alternatives, one can hardly expect
a false consensus phenomenon, in the sense just described.
However, the essence of the false consensus phenomenon is the
subject's assumption that others are the same as himself. He
projects his own motivation on to others. In this sense one
could expect subjects to use their own dominant motivation as
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criterion for determining the similarity between the goals
of the different Choosers. However, the results of the INDSCAL
analysis carried out on the weights of the four groups of
subjects on the two dimensions (Figure 3-3) show that this
can only apply to the Competitors.
According to the triangle hypothesis the false consensus
phenomenon is only seen among competitively oriented and not
among cooperatively oriented persons. This latter group shows
a greater discrimination in attributing opinions to others.
Translated into the terms of the study in Chapter 3, this
means that Cooperators employ a certain criterion less
stringently than Competitors in evaluating the similarity of
the Choosers' goals. A closer examination of the weights
ascribed to subjects on theINDSCAL dimensions in Figure 3-3
reveals that there is little variability in the weights for
the group of Competitors. All Competitors have rather heavy
weights on the inequality dimension (dimension 1) and rather
low weights on the equality dimensíon (dimension 2). The
group of Cooperators on the other hand, shows more
variability. Three of the Cooperators have weights which are
at least as extreme as those of the Competitors. In contrast,
there are also three Cooperators with lower weights on
dimension 1 than the Competitors. In view of the small sample
size, however, it is not possible to make statistical tests
of significance. The results of the Individualists, whose
weights could have been expected to be somewhat similar to
those of the Competitors, and the results of the Altruists,
whose weights could have been expected to be similar to those
of the Cooperators do not lend themselves so readily to an
interpretation in terms of the triangle hypothesis. This
means that although there is some evidence in favor of the
triangle hypothesis, it is rather restricted. In general, the
results of the study in Chapter 3 can be considered as
indicative of the social comparison phenomenon.
It would not be correct to claim that social comparison is
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the only motivational force of significance for everyone and
in every situation. Kelley and Thibaut (1978) report various
possible transformations of a"given" interaction matrix. A
"relative gain transformation", as can be expected in many
situations on the basis of social comparison, is only one of
the transformations possible. Kelley and Thibaut assume that
transformations of the matrix can be learned:
"These transformational tendencies are represented in the
mature adult as social and personal values and as rules
for good and~or successful social conduct. These values
and rules may be prosocial, egoistical, or even anti-
social in nature. It is reasonable to assume that because
of their functional value these tendencies are acquired
not only as instrumentally useful procedures and rules
of thumb but also, by association with a broad spectrum
of gratifications, as aualities of value themselves."
(Pp. 21-22).
A transformational tendency can, up to a certain point,
become functionally autonomous, that is, it becomes a value
in itself and one which is pursued in every situation.
Empirical evidence for this has been furnished by Kuhlman and
Marshello (1975a) and by Bennett and Carbonari (1976) who
demonstrate that some motivational orientations correlate
with certain personality characteristics. In general, the
functional autonomy will be restricted. The transformational
tendencies are usually learned more in conditional than in
absolute terms. This means that the situation determines, to
a major extent, what the most appropriate transformational
tendency will be. mhis was expressed by McClintock (1972) in
one of his propositions:
"The environment may operate to define the availability
of outcomes to own and other in such a manner as to
increase or decrease the likelihood that a given
motivational predisposition will be dominant" (p. 451).
McClintock describes four sorts of setting, each of which
leads to a different motivational orientation. There is, for
example, an individualistic setting when an individual is not
in a situation of social interdependency with another or is
not conscious of being so (e.g. "the minimal social
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situation"). In a cooperative setting, on the other hand, the
individual is conscious of interdependency with others. He is
also aware that the joint outcomes of the interdependent
persons are more important than, for instance, his own out-
comes. This occurs on occasions as when the individual
considers himself as member of a group which is comparing
itself with another group. As examples of a competitive
setting McClintock describes (p. 452) sport situations and
the ranking of students in schools. In fact many situations
in which an indivídual compares himself, or is compared, with
another are actually competitive settings. An altruistic
orientation is more likely when the outcomes for Other are
perceived as relatively high in relation to the costs for
the individual himself. Examples of this are a parent who
forgoes winning a game with his child, or a motorist who
stops to give aid to a disable motorist. A third example
described by McClintock is rather dubious:
"As we have occasionally observed in game studies, a
player may begin to select alternatives that meet our
definition of altruism when he has built up an enormous
lead over another player."
As Rijsman and Poppe (1977, and cf. Chapter 4 of this thesis)
show, the latter example can also be interpreted in terms of
social comparison.
In the situation presented to the subjects in the study
described in Chapter 3, recoqnition of one of the four
motivational settinqs will not be easy. This means that it is
difficult to determine, a priori, that a certain motivation
is the most appropriate one. For this reason it is remarkable
that subjects with different dominant motivational pre-
dispositions display a considerable degree of agreement in
their assessments of the similarity of the Choosers' goals.
The results of the study in Chapter 4 indicate that the
subjects do not introduce any systematic chanoes in the
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functional aspects of the matrix, such as RC and FC but do
introduce such changes in general aspects such as GM. The
changes in GM can be interpreted quite satisfactorily in the
light of the social comparison theory. The phenomenon of
social comparison becomes manifest, not only in the form of
competition, but also - depending on the position in relation
to the Other with whom the subject is comparing himself - in
the form of other motives, such as martyrdom and altruism.
The fact that the changes in GM are determined to such a
large extent by social comparison ties in with Thibaut and
Kelley's (1959) ideas concernina the Comparison Level. As
described in Chapter 1, Thibaut and Kelley consider the
matrix values as being scaled along a dimension which has, as
its subjective zero-point, the Comparison Level ("the
standard against which the member evaluates the 'attractive-
ness' of the relationship"). By changing the matrix values,
the subjects, in fact, change the distance to the zero-point
(CL). The location of the CL is determined by the outcomes
obtained by the individual in previous situations or by
observing the outcomes that Others obtain. As the experimental
situation in Chapter 4 was an entirely new one for the
subjects, the CL in this case could not have been based on
a subject's previous experience. In this study the only
reference points a subject can take to evaluate his own
matrix values are the matrix values of the Other with whom he
is interacting.
As already explained in Chapter 2, an individual can consider
his behavior, his body and his possessions as cues for his
person. Clearly, in the experimental situation, the subjects
will take, as cues for their own person, mainly the
quantities of outcomes that can be obtained, according to the
matrix values. As predicted by the social comparison theory,
people generally attempt to avoid or to cancel out a deficit
in GM and to achieve a slightly higher GM than the other
person. When the difference in the matrix value means of the
two persons is relatively large, the person in the favorable
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position will reduce the difference in such a way that the
mean of his own matrix values is slightly higher than that
of the other person. The phrase "slightly higher than that
of the other person" is actually a very vague one. The
subjects in the conditions SS and SE begin with a difference
in GM of 6 units to their advantage. They reduce this
difference (and allow it to be reduced) to 3.75 and 3.0
units, respectively. The subjects who begin with an initial
position in the matrix identical to that of Other, but who
are given better possibilities of changing (condition ES)
are satisfied if they manage to obtain a GM difference of
1.0 unit. The mathematical functions that Rijsman (1979b)
derived from the social comparison model are, as yet, only of
siqnificance for understandinq the model, as such. In order
to use the derivatives as predictions for concrete
situations one would have to have recourse to a form of
psychophysics dealing with the experience of self as
(in)equal to the Other on a certain dimension.
The study concerning the changing of the matrix is based on
the type of matrix usually employed in experimental games.
This is also the sort of matrix used by Thibaut and Kelley
(1959) in their analysis of interpersonal interaction (cf.
Chapter 1). The values in the matrix (and the outcomes) are
defined as the rewards obtained by means of the interaction,
minus the costs involved by the interaction. In this view of
the matrix little attention is paid to a number of important
factors which may affect the evaluation of outcomes obtained
or to be obtained. These factors are personal characteristics
such as education, intelligence, experience, traininq, skill,
seniority, age, sex, ethnic background, social status and
physical attractiveness. Homans (1961) calls the factors (in
so far a~ they are relevant to the interaction) "investments";
Adams (1965) calls them "inputs". Incidentally, they would
also classify as investments and inputs the time spent on the
interaction and the efforts made, factors that Thibaut and
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Kelley aould classify as "costs". With regard to abilities,
Thibaut and Kelley (1959, pp. 37-39) remark only that
possession of these means that a person can create a high
reward for the Other in the interaction, at low cost to
himself.
As 3escribed in Chapter 2, an Individual (I) can consider
his inputs as a cue for his person (PI) and Other's inputs
as a cue for the other person (PC). By means of these cues
I will seek to obtain a slightly superior position for PI,
in relation to P~, on the relevant dimension. It was also
stated in Chapter 2 that I wishes to see a reflection of the
input ratio in the ratio of the outcomes obtained by himself
and Other in the interaction, in order to have his opinion
about the position of PI relative to PD validated, in this
way. The choice of a certain behavioral alternative
determines, together with the alternative that Other chooses,
whether a certain comparison of inputs is possible, or is not
possible, and whether the individuals involved in the inter-
action will obtain outcomes that reflect their inputs.
As regards the inputs, a distinction must be made between
those concerning one or a few items from the behavioral
repertoire and those concerning a large number of items from
the behavioral repertoire. An example of the former category
of inputs is found in the skills that an individual has at
his disposal to use in certain actions. Examples of the
latter category are the more general characteristics of the
individual such as status, age, and so on. :Then there is no
question of item-specific inputs, as in the majority of
experiments with experimental games, only a comparison on
general dimensions will be nossible.
The results of the study in Chapter 5 are rather complex.
In the condition in which subjects receive no feedback on the
choices in the probabilistic matrix (condition III) the
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choices appear to be correlated, in some special way, with
the outcomes on the previous trial. If the subject himself
has received no reward while Other has, then the subject is
less inclined to repeat the previous choice than after the
three other possible combinations for the preceding trial.
This particular combination of outcomes is the only
combination in which a subject suffers a loss in relation to
the other. The fact that a subject, after a relative loss,
is more inclined to change his choice can be related to
Messick and Thorngate's (1967) finding that avoiding
relative loss is a stronger motivational force than obtaining
relative gain. This finding ties in with social comparison
theory. Changing the choice to avoid relative loss makes
sense when that relative loss has been incurred in a trial
in which the subject made a C-choice. Changing from a C- to
a D-choice will reduce the probability of relative loss.
However, if the subject makes a C-choice after a D-choice
the probability of relative loss will definitely not become
smaller. It indicates that the subject has responded to a
certain principle in rather a mechanical way. This is some-
what reminiscent of the "win-stay, lose change" principle
only in this case one should interpret "lose" as relative
loss and "win" as relative gain or as remaining relatively
equal. Actually, it is not a matter of 100~ probability that
the subject will, or will not alter his choice. There is
relatively more likelihood that a subject will change his
choice when he has suffered a relative loss than when he has
not suffered a relative loss.
If the subject is aware of Other's choices in the
probabilistic matrix (condition II) his choices appear to be
barely contingent on the outcomes obtained in the previous
trial. In this condition the subject's choice is mainly
determined by his own and Other's choice in the previous
trial. From the results of the two conditions one can deduce
that the information the subject receives is of a different
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type in each of the two conditions. In condition III social
comparison is the only possibility. The subject can compare
himself with Other on the basis of the outcomes obtained
from the interaction. Validation of one's evaluation of the
comoarison is hardly possible because the subject is unable,
because of the role played by chance, to determine what
exactly the Other has chosen. In condition II, however, it
is possible for him to determine this. In this conditíon a
choice made by Individual A in a PDG can be taken by the
other (B) as being an attitude toward the result of the
comparison of PA and PB on the basis of cues derived from
the outcome scores. A D-choice by Individual A can be inter-
preted by Individual B as an attempt to alter the relative
position of the outcomes to A's advantage. If the outcomes
of A and B are taken as cues for PA and PB then a D-choice
by A means that he does not validate B's opinion of the
actual or realizable result of the comparison. A C-choice
by A, however, can be seen by B as a validation of B's
opinion of the actual or realizable result of the comparison
of PB with PA.
Chapter 2 explains that it is difficult for two individuals
to validate each other's opinion of the results of the
comparison when a comparison is made on one dimension. The
problem can be solved if the dimension of comparison can be
split into two, mutually independent dimensions. However,
this is not possible in an experimental game. Hence, in a
game of this sort many D-choices are answered with D-choices.
In fact a new matrix has appeared which now has validation
outcomes as matrix values. This new matrix appears to be a
zero-sum-game. The one individual is unable to confirm the
superiority of Other's without thereby admitting his own
inferiority. A possible solution is that the two individuals
abandon the comparison and both make C-choices in the PDG.
Since factors of uncertainty are of less importance in the
deterministic matrix than in the probabilistic matrix, this
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solution is found more easily in the former than in the
latter.
In Chapter 1 we mentioned that there is relatively little
theory in the field of experimental games. An attempt has
now been made, in three studies, to investigate the
explanatory value of social comparison in game situations.
Although there is still uncertainty and some questions
remain unanswered, it can nevertheless be concluded that
the social comparison theory can prove valuable in
explaining the various phenomena. Furthermore, experimental
games (with the addition of some modifications, where
necessary) have proved their worth as a paradigm for
researching certain theoretical questions.
It3
Summary
In this dissertation consisting of 6 chapters, the explanatory
value of social comparison theory in two-person experimental
games is examined. Three experiments in this field are
reported in chapters 3 to S, inclusive. These chapters are
preceded by two introductory chapters dealing with the aspects
of experimental games and social comparison relevant to the
experiments and followed by a chapter in which some results
are discussed.
Chapter 1 contains an exposition of experimental games as
interpersonal choice situations. The Prisoner's Dilemma Game
(PDG) is described as an example of such games which
originated in game theory and were later included in social
osychology. It is noted that in social psychology there is
relatively little theory in relation to the host of empirical
studies in the field of experimental games. An important
exception is Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) "Theory of Inter-
dependence", some essential points of which are described.
The notion "fate control" in this theory is illustrated by
means of the "minimal social situation". The last part of the
chapter describes how the introduction of certain kinds of
games (such as the Maximizing Difference Game and decomposed
games) by McClintock and his collegues and students made it
possible to study other motives in addition to the own gain
maximization motive from game theory. These motives can be
presented as vectors in a two-dimensional vector space with
the outcomes of a certain choice for a person himself as one
principal axis and the outcomes for another person as the
other principal axis. In certain cases, however, it turns out
that the motives are more descriptive than explanatory.
In chapter 2 Rijsman's (1979a, b; in press a, b) theory of
social motivation is described.This theory expounds how an
individual experiences himself in relation to others. This
Self~Other experience is based upon processes of social
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attribution, social comparison and social validation. In the
process of social attribution the individual reduces variable
stimuli to cues for his own person. On the basis of these cues
the individual compares his own person with other persons. He
shows at the same time a tendency towards being similar to
others as well as a tendency towards being different from the
others. This results in preferring to be just somewhat better
than other persons on dimensions which are positively
evaluated. The subjective ooinion of an individual on the
result of a comparison with an other person attains more
general validity when the individual can coordinate action
tendencies which are included in this opinion, with action
tendencies of others. The social comparison process mentioned
is described more specifically in the form of a model. Two
elaborations of Rijsman's theory are described, one on equity
and another on roles.
Chapter 3 examines whether, on a coanitive level, the
dimension of obtaining relatívely more or fewer outcomes than
an other person ( the competition dimension) is more important
than others in the two-dimensional vector space. For this
reason four groups of subjects were presented with a
hypothetical situation. The subjects were classified on the
basis of the Kuhlman and Marshello (1975) method and on the
basis of choices in some Commons Dilemma Games as dominantly
competitive, individualistic, cooperative or altruistic.
According to the descrintion of this situation nine lotteries
had been organized and in each there were two prizewinners.
Chance determined which of the two was allowed to make a
choice out of 9 alternatives. Each of these alternatives
brought a given amount of money to the Chooser and a given
amount to the other winner. These amounts were determined so
that ( a) 8 alternatives were located each on the principal
axes or diagonals of the two-dimensional vector space and
(b) these S altarnatives were situated on a circle with the
ninth point as the center. According to the description in
each lottery the person who was allowed to make a choice,
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chose an other alternative. The selections of the Choosers
were presented pairwise to the subjects, who were asked to
indicate how (dis)similarly they evaluated the Choosers'
goals. Indeed, an INDSCAL analysis of the data shows a
structure with the alternatives ordered on the most
important dimension to the degree the Chooser himself or the
other prizewinner got rel.atively more outcomes. A second
dimension is found, on which the alternatives giving the
Chooser about as much as the other are located on one side
and the alternatives givina one of the two persons more than
the other on the other side. No differences in the weights
of the four groups of subjects are found on the two
dimensions.
In the same investigation the subjects were asked to evaluate
the degree of relevance of certain labels with regard to the
goals associated with choosing a certain alternative. On the
most imoortant dimension found in the data by means of a
discriminant analysis the alternatives are located in about
the same order as on the first dimension of the I'iDSCAL
structure.
In chapter 4 an experiment is described in which the subjects,
in each of 10 trials, got the opportunity to change one of
the matrix entries relating to their own outcomes up to a
certain maximum and, up to the same maximum, to change one
of the matrix entries relatina to the outcomes of the other
person in the game matrix. Some of the subjects started in
the suoerior and others in the inferior position in an
asymmetrical matrix. Still other subjects started in a
symmetrical matrix. Independently of this, some subjects
could chanoe the matríx entries uo to a maximum of three
units while others, with whom they were interacting in the
matrix, could change the entries uo to a maximum of one unit.
Others again could change the entries up to the same maximum
(2 units) as the other person in the matrix. In the matrix
entries of a person Kelley and Thibaut (1978) distinguish
four components, namely a aeneral mean (GM), a comoonent
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indicating the influence a person has on his own outcomes
(RC), a component indicating the influence the other person
has on a person's outcomes (FC), and a component indicating
the influence that both persons in combination have on the
outcomes of one of them (BC).
It was predicted from social comparison theory that the
subjects would change the matrix entries so as to cancel out
a backlog in components GM, RC and FC and would try to gaín
a small lead (eventually by reducing too big a lead) in these
components. These predictions are generally confirmed with
regard to the GM component. It is found that the RC and FC
components are chanaed rather unsystematically.
Chapter 5 considers whether the choices in a PDG are mainly
contingent on the outcomes of the last trial or on the
choices of the last trial. Taking social comparison theory
as the basis one can expect more contingency on outcomes
than on choices. As outcomes in a classic PDG are completely
determined by choices, a so-called probabilistic version of
the PDG is designed. In this version the matrix entries do
not indicate the outcomes, but chances of achieving a certain
outcome. In this situation in some cases a subject does and
in others does not gain a reward. Receiving a reward is only
partly determined by choices of the one and the other person
in the matrix.
In the experiment each of 27 subject pairs made 250 choices
in a classic, deterministic version or a orobabílistic
version of a PDG. After each trial all subjects in the
deterministic and some in the qrobabilistic PDG receive
feedback on the choice made by the other person in that
trial. Other subjects did not receive feedback on the choice
made by the other subject. After each trial all subjects
received feedback on the scores and total scores of both
persons. The results show that if a subject does not know
the choice of the other person, his own choices are
contingent on the outcomes in the last trial in a specific
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way. The subjects tend to alter their choice if they them-
selves did not and the other did receive a reward in the last
trial. This is esoecially the case after a C-choice, but to a
lesser extent also after a D-choice. If, after each trial a
subject receives feedback on the choice the other person made
then his choices are mainly contingent on those of the two
oersons in the last trial.
Zn chapter 6 the discussion of the results of the experiments
is continued. With regard to the results of chaoter 3 it is
noted that they do not show the so-called "false consensus"
phenomenon and give but indications in the direction of
verification of the "triangle hypothesis". The changes in the
GM component of the matrix are related to Thibaut and
Kelley's (1959) "Comparison Level" notion. With regard to the
way Thibaut and Kelley conceive a matrix, it is noted that
they neglect the importance of the "inputs" of an individual
in an interaction. The results of the exoeriment dealt with
in chaoter 5 are related to social validation.
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Samenvattinq
In dit proefschrif~, dat uit 6 hoofdstukken bestaat, wordt de
verklarende waarde van de sociale vergelijkingstheorie in
experimental games onderzocht. In de hoofdstukken 3 t~m 5
worden hierover dríe experimenten gerapporteerd. Deze hoofd-
stukken worden voorafgegaan door twee inleidende hoofdstuk-
ken waarin voor de experimenten relevante aspecten van
experimental games en sociale vergelijking beschreven worden
en gevolgd door een hoofdstuk waarin sommige onderzoeksre-
sultaten worden bediscussieerd.
Hoofdstuk 1 bevat een uiteenzetting over experimental games
als interpersoonlijke keuzesituaties. Als voorbeeld van der-
gelijke games, die oorspronkelijk ontstaan zijn in de Spel-
theorie en later in de sociale psychologie zijn bestudeerd,
wordt het Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) beschreven: Er is
opgemerkt dat er in de sociale psychologie betrekkelijk
weinig theorie is in verhouding tot de grote hoeveelheid em-
pirische studies op het gebied van experimental games. Een
belangrijke uitzondering hierop vormt Kelley en Thibaut's
(1978) "Theory of Interdependence", waarvan enkele essentiële
punten worden beschreven. Het begrip "fate control" uit deze
theorie wordt toegelicht aan de hand van de zogenaamde
"minimale sociale situatie". In het laatste deel van het
hoofdstuk wordt beschreven hoe de introductie van bepaalde
soorten games (zoals het Maximizing Difference Game en
decomposed games) 3oor McClintock en zijn collega's en stu-
denten het mogelijk maakte, behalve het eigen winstmaximali-
satie motief uit de Speltheorie, ook andere motieven in
experimental games te bestuderen. Deze motieven kunnen worden
voorgesteld als vectoren in een twee-dimensionele vector-
ruimte, met de opbrengsten van een bepaalde keuze voor een
persoon zelf als de ene hoofdas en de opbrengsten voor een
Andere persoon als de andere hoofdas. In bepaalde gevallen
blijken de motieven echter meer een beschrijvende dan een
verklarende betekenis te hebben.
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In hoofdstuk 2 wordt Rijsman's (1979a, b; in press a, b)
sociale motivatie-theorie beschreven. In deze theorie wordt
de wijze uiteengezet waarop een individu zichzelf in relatie
tot anderen ervaart. Deze Zelf~Ander ervaring berust op pro-
cessen van sociale attributitie, sociale veraelijking en
sociale valídatie. In het proces van sociale attributie
reduceert het individu variabele stimuli tot tekens van zijn
eigen persoon. Op basis van deze tekens vergelijkt het in-
dividu zijn eigen persoon met Anderen, waarbij zowel een ten-
dens naar gelijkheid met de andere personen als een tendens
om van deze personen te verschillen, een rol spelen. Dit re-
sulteert in juist-iets-beter willen zijn op positief gewaar-
deerde persoonsdimensies dan andere personen. Het subjectieve
oordeel van een Individu over het resultaat van de verge-
lijking met een vergelijkingspersoon, krijgt meer algemene
geldigheid wanneer het Individu actietendenties die in het
oordeel zijn vervat, met actietendenties van Anderen kan
coSrdineren. Het sociale vergelijkingsproces uit deze theorie
is meer specifiek in modelvorm weergegeven. Twee uitwerkingen
van Rijsman's theorie zijn beschreven, één over billijkheid
en de andere over rolverdeling.
In hoofdstuk 3 is nagegaan of de dimensie van relatief ineer
versus minder opbrengsten dan een ander verkrijgen (de com-
petitiedimensie) op cognitief vlak belangrijker is dan andere
dimensies in de tweedimensionele vectorruimte van motieven.
Hiertoe werd aan vier groepen proefpersonen, die op basis van
een classificatiemethode van Kuhlman en Marshello (1975) en
op basis van keuzen in enige Commons Dilemma Games als over-
wegend competitief, individualistisch, cobperatief of altru-
istisch waren geclassificeerd, een hypothetische situatie
voorgelegd. Volgens de beschrijving van deze situatie waren
er 9 loterijen gehouden en waren er in iedere loterij twee
prijswinnaars. Door het lot werd bepaald wie van deze twee
winnaars een keuze mocht maken uit 9 alternatieven. Ieder van
deze alternatieven leverde een bepaalde som geld op voor de
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kiezer en een bepaalde som geld op voor de andere winnaar.
Deze sommen geld waren zó bepaald dat a) 8 alternatieven
ieder op één van de hoofdassen of diagonalen van de twee-
dimensionele vectorruimte gelokaliseerd waren en b) deze 8
alternatieven op een cirkel lagen met het negende punt als
middelpunt. Volgens de beschrijving koos in iedere loterij
degene die de keuze mocht maken een ander alternatief. De
proefpersonen kregen de keuzen van de prijswinnaars paars-
gewijs aangeboden. Hen werd gevraagd, aan te geven hoe (on-)
gelijk zij de doeleinden (goals) van de Kiezers vonden. Een
INDSCAL-analyse van de gegevens levert inderdaad een struc-
tuur op met op de belangrijkste dim~nsie de alternatieven
geordend in de mate waarin de Kiezer zelf of de andere
prijswinnaar relatief ineer opbrengsten krijgt. Er wordt
tevens een tweede dimensie gevonden waarop aan de ene kant
de alternatieven liggen volgens welke de Kiezer en de an-
dere prijswinnaar ongeveer evenveel krijgen en aan de andere
kant de alternatieven liggen die voor één van beide personen
meer opleveren dan voor de ander. Er zijn geen verschillen
gevonden in de gewichten van de vier groepen proefpersonen
op de twee dimensies.
In hetzelfde onderzoek werden proefpersonen gevraagd om de
mate van relevantie van bepaalde labels voor de doeleinden
die met de keuze van een bepaald alternatief worden geasso-
cieerd, te scoren. Op de belangrijkste dimensie, die met
behulp van discriminant analyse in deze data wordt gevonden,
liggen de alternatieven in ongeveer dezelfde volgorde als
op de eerste dimensie van de INDSCAL structuur.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een experiment beschreven waarin proef-
personen de mogelijkheid kregen om gedurende tien beurten
telkens één van de matrixwaarden die op hun eigen opbreng-
sten betrekkinq hadden en één van de matrixwaarden die ou de
o~brengsten van de andere persoon in een game-matrix betrek-
king hadden, met een bepaald maximum aantal eenheden te ver-
anderen. Sommige proefpersonen begonnen met een superieure
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en andere met een inferieure positie in een asymmetrische
matrix. Weer andere proefpersonen begonnen in een symme-
trische matrix. Onafhankelijk hiervan konden sommige proef-
personen de matrixwaarden met maximaal drie eenheden veran-
deren, terwijl de anderen, met wie zij in de matrix inter-
acteerden, de waarden met maximaal één eenheid konden ver-
anderen. Weer andere proefpersonen konden de waarden met
evenveel (maximaal twee) eenheden veranderen als de andere
persoon in de matrix. Kelley en Thibaut (1978) beschrijven
dat de matrixwaarden voor een persoon zijn samengesteld uit
vier componenten, namelijk een algemeen qemiddelde (GM),
een component die de invloed aangeeft die een persoon zelf
op zijn eigen opbrengsten heeft (RC), een component die de
invloed aangeeft die de andere persoon heeft op de opbreng-
sten van een persoon (FC) en een component die de invloed
aangeeft die beide personen in combinatie hebben op de op-
brengsten van één van hen (BC). Op basis van de sociale
vergelijkingstheorie wordt voorspeld, dat de proefpersonen
de matrixwaarden z6 zouden veranderen, dat zij een achter-
stand in de componenten GM, RC en FC zouden elimineren en
een matige voorsprong zouden trachten te verkrijgen in deze
drie componenten (eventueel door een reductie van een te
grote voorsprong). Deze voorspellingen zijn voor de GM-
component in het algemeen bevestigd. De RC- en FC-componen-
ten blijken op weinig systematische wijze veranderd te
worden.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt nagegaan of de keuzen van proefpersonen
in een PDG vooral contingent zijn met de opbrengsten die de
personen in de vorige beurt verkregen of vooral contingent
zijn met de keuzen die de personen in de vorige beurt ge-
maakt hebben. Op basis van de sociale vergelijkingstheorie
kan men meer contingentie met opbrengsten dan met keuzen
verwachten. Omdat in de klassieke vorm van het PDG de op-
brengsten volledig door de keuzen bepaald zijn, is een zo-
genaamde probabilistische versie van het PDG ontworpen. In
deze versie geven de matrixwaarden geen opbrengsten aan,
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maar de kansen dat men een bepaalde opbrengst behaalt. In
deze situatie behaalt een proefpersoon in sommige keuzen wel
e1 in andere geen beloning. Of hij een beloning ontvangt,
wordt slechts gedeeltelijk door zijn eigen keuzen en door die
van de andere persoon in de matrix bepaald. In het experiment
maakten 27 paren proefpersonen ieder 250 keuzen: in een klas-
siek deterministisch PDG of een probabilistisch PDG. Alle
proefpersonen in het deterministisch en sommige proefpersonen
in het probabilistisch PDG kregen na iedere beurt informatie
over de keuze van de andere persoon in die beurt. Aan andere
proefpersonen werd de informatie over de keuze van de ander
ziet meegedeeld. Alle proefpersonen kregen feedback over de
scores en over de totale scorestanden van beide personen na
iedere beurt. Uit de resultaten blijkt, dat als de proef-
personen niet de keuze van de andere persoon kennen, hun
eigen keuzen op een speciale manier contingent zíjn met de
opbrengsten die in de vorige beurt behaald zijn. De proef-
personen zijn meer geneigd hun keuze te veranderen als zij
zelf geen beloning hadden ontvangen en de ander wel een be-
loning had ontvangen in de vorige beurt. Dit geldt vooral
na een C-keuze, maar in mindere mate ook voor een D-keuze.
Als de proefpersoon na iedere beurt de keuze van de andere
persoon meegedeeld wordt, dan zijn de keuzen vooral contin-
gent met de keuzen van de twee personen in de vorige beurt.
In hoofdstuk 6 worden de resultaten van de experimenten
verder bediscussieerd, Met betrekking tot de resultaten van
hoofdstuk 3 wordt opgemerkt, dat ze niet op een zogenaamd
"false consensus" verschijnsel wijzen en slechts in geringe
mate de triangle-hypothese ondersteunen. De veranderingen
van de GM-component van de matrix worden in verband gebracht
met het begrip "Comparison Level" van Thibaut en Kelley
(1959). Met betrekking tot de wijze waarop Thibaut en Kelley
een matrix opvatten, wordt opgemerkt, dat zij de rol van
"inputs" van een individu in een interactie verwaarlozen.
De resultaten van het experiment van hoofdstuk 5 worden in
verband gebracht met sociale validatie.
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Appe:~3ix 1. Commons Dilemmas used in chapter 3.
Diler~a 0 X
a to me ~ 2.00 ~ 8.00
to others ~ 0.00 - ~ 2.00~
B to me ~ 1.00 ~ 7.00
to others ~ 0.25 -~ 1.75~
C to me ~ 0.40 ~ 6.40
to others S 0.40 -; 1.60x
D to me S 0.00 ~ 6.00
to others ~ 0.50 - ~ 1.50~
E to me -8 6.00~ ~ 0.00
to others ~ 2.00 ~ 0.00
~ Negative payments were truncated to S 0.00.
Example Dilemma A
Number Choosing Payment to Payment to Number Choosina
X X Chooser 0 Chooser O
5 ~ 0.00 ------ 0
4 ~ 2.00 -8 6.00 1
3 ~ 4.00 -~ 4.00 2
2 ~ 6.00 -~ 2.00 3
1 ~ 8.00 ~ 0.00 9
0 ------ ~ 2.00 5
If e.g. there are 2 X-Choosers and 3 O-Choosers, each of
the X-Choosers obtains ~6.00 and each of the 0-Choosers
obtains -~ 4.00.
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Appendix 2. Classification games.
Game A B C
1 Units to ME 90 70 60
Units to OTHER LO 20 20
2 Units to ME 70 60 40
Units to OTHER 60 40 30
3 Units to ME 50 40 40
Units to OTHER 20 0 40
4 Units to ME 50 40 20
Units to OTHER 10 30 0
5 Units to ME 60 70 60
Units to OTHER 60 40 20
6 Units to ME 20 50 40
Units to OTHER 10 40 20
7 Units to ME 40 70 60
Units to OTHER 20 30 50
8 Units to ME 20 60 40
Units to OTHER 20 0 10
9 Units to ME 50 50 60
Units to OTHER 10 50 30
10 Units to ME 50 40 70
Units to OTEiER LO 30 20
11 Units to ME 70 50 80
Units to OTEiER 60 30 40
12 Units to ME 70 50 80
Units to OTEIER 50 40 70
Own Joint Relative Alter
A A A B or C
A A B B
A C B C
A B A B
B A C A
B B C B
B C B C
B B B A
C B A B
C C C B
C A C A














Appendix 3. Standardised discriminant function coefficients.














Appendix 4;. ~"InVAs of c}iange scores of conditi.ons II, RI and ;I
(3~l
SS df MS F-ratio p SS I df I MS IF-ratio SS I df aMS ~-ratí~FC'
A - starting-
position 0.018 2 0.009 0.253 1.163 2 0.582 1.804 0.790 2 0.395 0.700
Error l~etween 0.935 27 0.035 8.705 27 0.322 15.245 27 0.565
B- trials ~.186 9 0.021 1.624 2.518 9 0.280 1.399 0.752 9 0.084 0.400
A x B 0.193 18 0.011 0.843 4.812 18 0.267 1.337 2.368 18 0.132 0.631
B x subj.w.gr. 3.090 243 0.013 48.595 243 0.200 50.705 243 0.209
~
C- Self~Other 15.360 1 15.360 90.873 0.602 1 0.602 2.006 0.015 1 0.015 0.035
A x C 0.558 2 0.279 1.649 0.373 2 0.187 0.622 0.030 2 0.015 0.035
C x subj.w.ar. 4.564 27 0.169 8.100 27 0.300 11.930 27 0.423
~
B x C 0.534 9 0.059 1.992 2.040 9 0.227 1.037 1.360 9 0.151 0.895
A x B x C 0.499 18 0.028 0.930 3.785 18 0.210 0.962 4.145 18 0.230 1.364
B x C x subj.w.cir. 7.236 243 0.030 53.100 293 0.219 41.020 243 0.169
Total 33.171 599 33.793 599 127.860 599
z :~1c ~ek
p~ O.nS p C 0.01 p C 0.001
?inoendix 4t~. n"li)V~:; o~ chin~c scores of con~liCion, ir and EE
~ ~ FC'
SS df MS F-ratio SS df N6 F-ratio SS df hLS -ratio
A - starting-
position 0,017 1 0.017 0.184 2.933 1 2.933
~
4.643 0.170 1 0.170 0.378
Error betzaeen 1.687 18 0.099 11.369 18 0.632 8.107 18 0.450
R- trials 0.652 9 0.073 ].327 6.094 9 0.677 1.523 7.075 9 0.786 1.338
:~ x A 0.432 9 0.048 0.878 5.500 9 0.611 1.375 7.1G~~ 9 0.797 1.355
B x subj.w.qr. 8.851 162 0.055 72.009 162 0.449 95.209 162 0.588
~e
C- Self~Other 20.194 l 20.194 34.807 0.004 1 0.004 0.009 0.098 1 0.098 0.155
A x C 0.186 1 0.186 0.321 0.098 1 0.098 0.225 2.364 1 2.369 3.793
C x subj.w.gr. 1G.443 18 0.581 7.827 18 0.935 11.367 ]8 0.631
z
B x C 1.502 9 0.166 2.042 3.741 9 0.416 1.009 3.779 9 0.420 1.041
A x B x C 0.819 9 0.091 1.119 3.760 9 0.418 1.014 3.225 9 0.358 0.88~3
B x C x siil~j,w,gr. 13.239 162 0.082 66.727 162 0.412 65.324 1E;2 0.403
'Ibtal 58.022 399 180.061 399 203.886 399 - --
~ ~ ~
p C 0.05 p C 0.01 p C 0.001
Appendix 4~. ANOVAs of change scores of conditions IE and SE
~ ~ ~ -
SS df MS F-ratio SS df h1S F-rati SS df NLS F-ratio
Between dyads 7..193 9 0.238 9.210 9 1.023 9.685 9 1.076
A - starting-
position 0.141 1 0.141 0.604 1.323 1 1.323 1.581 0.202 1 0.202 0.252
A x subj.w.groups 2.094 9 0.233 7.528 9 0.836 7.222 9 0.802
B- trials 0.231 9 0.026 0.420 5.148 9 0.572 0.976 6.998 9 0.778 0.931
B x subj.w.groups 4.948 81 0.061 97.452 81 0.586 67.628 81 0 835
C- Self~Otl~er 11.391 1 11.391
~
9.057 0.722 1 0.722 1.936 0.302 1
.
0.302 0.349
(àc subj.w.groups 11.319 9 1.258 4.528 9 0.503 7.922 9 0.880~
A x B 1.300 9 0.144 2.433 4.215 9 0.468 0.813 8.185 9 0.909 1.272
A x B x subj.w.qr. 4.809 81 0.059 46.685 81 0.576 57.890 81 0.715
~1e
A x C 2.902 1 2.902 12.622 0.160 1 0.160 0.156 0.040 1 0.090 0.066
A x C x subj.w.gr. 1.713 9 0.190 9.240 9 1.027 5.985 9 0.609
B x C 1.106 9 0.123 1.142 2.590 9 0.288 0.500 3.510 9 0.390 0.810
B x C x subj.w.gr. 8.716 81 0.108 46.660 81 0.576 39.015 81 0.482~
A x B x C 3.344 9 0.372 2.336 4.102 9 0.456 0.671 1.272 9 0.141 0.225
A x B x C x subj.w. 12.889 81 0.159 59.998 81 0.679 50.952 81 0.6299r.
Zbtal 68.540 399 244.560 399 266.310 399
x pc0.05 ~ pG0.01 ~ pC0.001
Appendix 4D. ANOVAs of change scores of conditions EE and SE
~ AC FC'
SS df MS F-ratio SS df MS F-ratio SS df NLS -ratio
A - starting-
position 0.059 1 0,059 0,250 0.406 1 0.906 0.847 2.364 1 2.369 9.052
Error between 4.281 18 0.238 8.634 18 0.480 10.502 18 0.583
B- trials 0.265 9 0.029 0,568 7.189 9 0.799 1.524 3.633 9 0.404 0.627
A x A 0.444 9 0.049 0.952 1.645 9 0.183 0.349 3.48] 9 0.387 0.601
B x subj.w.qr. 8.395 162 0.052 84.894 162 0.529 104.264 162 0.649
tJe
C- Self~Other 8.666 1 8.666 10.805 1.351 1 1.351 2.267 0.975 1 0.975 2.230
A x C 1.252 1 1.252 1.561 0.620 1 0.620 1.090 0.056 1 0.057 0.129
C x subj.w.gr. 14.437 18 0.802 10.731 18 0.596 7.872 18 0.937
i9~
B x C 2.391 9 0.266 2.657 1.962 9 0.218 0.541 7.183 9 0.798 1.889
A x B x C 1.255 9 0.139 1.395 2,919 9 0.324 0.804 2.701 9 0.300 0.709
B x C x subj.w.gr, 16.195 162 0.100 65.322 162 0.403 68.619 162 0.~24
Zbtal 57.640 399 185.675 399 211.650 399
~ pG0.05 ~ pt0.01 ~ pt0.001
Appendix 4E. ANOVAs of change scores of conditions IS, RS and SS
C3~1 liC FC ~
SS df MS F-ratio SS df MS F-ratio SS df NLS -ratio
A - starting-
position 1.333 2 0.667 2.170 0.063 2 0.032 0.065 1.003 2 0.502 0.394
Error between 8.296 27 0.307 13.120 27 0.486 34.395 27 1.274
z
B- trials 0.459 9 0.051 0.411 13.883 9 1.543 1.653 17.198 9 1.911 1.978
A x A 2.181 18 0.121 0.978 11.162 18 0.620 0.665 19.272 18 1.071 1.108
B x subj.w.gr. 30.104 243 0.124 226.730 243 0.933 239.805 243 0.966
C- Self~Other 30.150 1 30.150 37.~9 0.027 1 0.027 0.041 0.042 1 0.042 0.047
A x C 9.916 2 4.958 6.215 0.653 2 0.327 0.503 5.103 2 2.552 2.897
C x subj.~~~.qr. 21.540 27 0.798 17.545 27 0.650 23.780 27 0.881
B x C 0.998 9 0.111 0.632 3.982 9 0.442 0.480 4.067 9 0.452 0.442
A x B x C 5.636 18 0.313 1.785 17.388 18 0.966 1.048 14.588 18 0.810 0.793
B x C x subj.w.gr. 42.635 243 0.175 223.905 243 0.921 298.420 243 1.022
1bta1 153.298 599 528.458 599 602.673 599
z pG0.05 ~ pc0.01 ~ pL0.001
Appendix 5A. Changes in GM of Self and Other, by starting-position, by trial.
Conditions of superior possibility to change the matrix.
Starting- trials
position I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ~an
Self 0.525~ 0.300 0.450 0.950 0.475 0.550 0.475 0.600 0.350 0.400 0.457
Inferior Other 0.375 -0.225 -0.275 -0.275 -0.400 -0.975 -0.375 -0.525 -0.400 -0.050 -0.337
Mean 0.075 0.038 0.088 0.088 0.038 0.038 0.050 0.038 -0.025 0.175 0.060
Self 0.400 0.475 0.325 0.425 0.425 0.350 0.325 0.225 0.225 0.275 0.345
~I~1 ~er. -0.125 -0.100 -0.175 0.225 0.050 -0.075 0.100 0.075 0.025 -0.250 -0.025
~an 0.138 0.188 0.075 0.325 0.238 0.138 0.213 0.150 0.125 0.013 0.160
Self 0.200 0.050 0.375 0.225 0.400 0.125 0.325 0.175 0.350 0.375 0.250
Superior Other 0.225 0.350 0.125 -0.075 0.100 0.050 -0.150 0.225 -0.025 -0.125 0.070
Mean 0.213 0.150 0.250 0.075 0.250 0.088 0.088 0.200 0.163 0.125 0.160
~ scores betzaeen -0.750 and 0.750
Appendix SB. Changes in GM of Self and Other, by starting-position, by trial.
Conditions of equal possibility to change the matrix.
Starting- trials j„~an
position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Self 0.35 0.275 0.450 0.450 0.225 0.250 0.350 0.325 0.050 0.250 0.298
Inferior Other -0.200 -0.300 -0.400 -0.225 -0.025 -0.175 -0.025 -0.250 -0.250 -0.100 -0.195
Mean 0.075 -0.012 0.025 0.113 0.100 0.037 0.163 0.037 -0.100 0.075 0.051
Self 0.237 0.300 0.237 0.262 0.250 0.250 0.337 0.300 0.300 0.150 0.267
Equal Other -0.038 -0.175 -0.263 -0.075 -0.075 -0.087 -0.225 -0.225 -0.187 -0.038 -0.139
ó1ean 0.100 0.062 0.012 0.094 0.087 0.081 0.056 0.037 0.056 0.056 0.064
Self 0.050 0.025 0.225 0.100 0.225 0.075 0.325 0.250 0.400 0.125 0.180
Superior Other 0.150 0.200 0.025 0.125 -0.175 0.000 -0.300 0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.002
Mean 0.100 0.113 0.125 0.113 0.025 0.038 0.013 0.150 0.175 0.038 0.089
~ scores between -0.500 and 0.500
Appendix 5C. Changes in GM of Self and Other, by starting-position, by trial.
Conditions of inferior possibility to change the matrix.
S~~`3` trialsposition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ~an
Self 0.200 0.250 0.200 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.200 0.175 0.250 ~.225 0.225
Inferior Other -0.175 -0.200 -0.075 -0.200 -0.200 -0.250 -0.150 -0.200 -0.150 -0.200 -0.180
Mean 0.012 0.025 0.063 0.025 0.025 0.000 0.025 -0.012 0.050 0.012 0.023
Self 0.125 0.150 0.150 0.250 0.125 0.100 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.]70
Ei~ual Other -0.025 -0.025 -0.075 -0.150 -0.150 -0.150 -0.100 -0.150 -0.150 -0."225 -0.120
Mean 0.050 0.063 0.037 0.050 -0.012 -0.025 0.050 0.025 0.025 -0.012 0.025
Self 0.100 0.100 0.125 0.125 0.250 0.175 0.175 0.200 0.200 0.225 O.168
Superior Other -0.050 -0.075 -0.100 0.000 -0.125 -0.175 -0.050 -0.125 -0.075 -0.200 -0.097
Mean 0.025 0.012 0.013 0.063 0.063 0.000 0.063 0.037 0.063 ~;.t~~~.~ ~~.t~!,3
~ scores betwaen -0.250 and 0.250
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